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TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Richard Gordon* 
At least since the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) first 
published its Forty Recommendations, financial institutions in FATF-
compliant jurisdictions have been required to implement preventive 
measures that require Fls to identifY customers, establish client profiles, 
monitor for unusual transactions, review those transactions to see if there 
was suspicion that they involved the proceeds of crime and, if so, report the 
transaction to the authorities in the form of a suspicious transaction report 
(STR). When these requirements were first established, neither financial 
institutions nor their supervisors/regulators had much experience as to 
what in a client's profile and the client's patterns of transactions might 
indicate money laundering. However, based on an expanding knowledge of 
how criminals tend to launder their money, over time financial institutions 
have developed increasingly effective detection and reporting systems. By 
studying known examples of laundering, the F ATF, F ATF-Style Regional 
Bodies, and national competent authorities (especially financial intelligence 
units) have identified patterns or indicators ofpossible money laundering, 
and made them available to financial institutions as money laundering 
typologies. In addition, there has been some feedback from financial 
intelligence units and other competent authorities to financial institutions 
with respect to their anti-money laundering programs. Using these sources, 
financial institutions have been able to develop systems to help them 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Adjunct Associate 
Professor of International Studies, Brown University. B.A. Yale (1978). J.D. Harvard Law 
School (1984). This preliminary report is to be used in the completion of a consolidated 
report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern University, the Honorable Susan Eckert of 
Brown University, and Professor Gordon. The consolidated report will include cases from 
jurisdictions other than the U.S. as well as additional analytical discussion and bibliograph-
ical material to be provided by Professor Passas and Ms. Eckert. Professor Passas and Ms. 
Eckert were equal participants in the scope and planning of the preliminary report on the 
U.S. and provided significant guidance and editorial assistance in its drafting. Student assis-
tants included Mark Skerry, Jonathan Calka, Daniel Straka, Pratibha Gupta, Jiajia Xu, AI 
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determine which transactions carry a materially greater risk that 
laundering is involved 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF 
adopted the VIII Special Recommendations on terrorist financing. Among 
these new requirements were that financial institutions also report to 
authorities if they suspected that a transaction involved the financing of 
terrorism. However, there was little in the wcry of known patterns of 
terrorism financing that financial institutions could use to help identify such 
transactions. While since that time a number of limited typology studies 
have been made available by the F ATF, no comprehensive study of 
terrorism financing typologies has yet been published For this reason, the 
Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force requested.a comprehensive 
study on past terrorism financing techniques that would add to value to 
efforts by both financial institutions and governmental authorities in 
identifying terrorism financing transactions or patterns, also known as 
typologies. 
This preliminary report on prosecutions in the US examined 266 
instances of prosecutions that involve charges of terrorism, material 
support of terrorism, or other terrorism-related matters. Of that number, 
thirty were determined to involve financial institutions. Using only publicly 
available information, the study found twenty-four where there was 
sufficient information on financial transactions to see if there were any 
discernible patterns or typologies for terrorism financing. The study 
revealed that sixteen of those indicated known typologies of money 
laundering, although an additional three appear to involve diversion of 
charitable donations. In only one was there a typology that suggested 
possible terrorism financing and not laundering. Of the sixteen cases 
involving suspicious transactions only three appeared to involve criminal 
proceeds. From these cases, it appears that terrorists often use money 
laundering techniques to disguise the origins of funds or to prevent 
competent authorities from tracing pcryments from end-users to originators, 
even when the origin is not criminal proceeds. However, because it was not 
possible to review any STRs (referred to in the US. as Suspicious Activity 
Reports or SARs) that mcry have been filed by financial institutions with 
respect to these transactions, it was not possible to determine if financial 
institutions, in conducting their review of those transactions, had 
determined that they were suspicious with respect to money laundering or 
terrorism financing. It was also impossible to know if FinCEN had referred 
such SARs to law enforcement for further investigation, or if they had added 
actionable intelligence to the SARs that would suggest either money 
laundering or terrorism financing. Such reviews would be most helpful in 
completing the study. 
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I. THE GLOBAL STANDARD AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
TERRORISM FINANCINd 
A. Overview 
Over the past forty years, anti-money laundering rules have been 
expanded and refined.2 The vast majority of the world's jurisdictions now 
1 Some of the introductory material for this Report is adopted from Richard K. Gordon, 
Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 699 (2008) [hereinafter Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?] and Richard K. Gordon, Los-
ing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laun-
dering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'LL. 503 (2011). 
2 The first anti-money laundering law enacted in the U.S. was The Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Reporting Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-59 (2000), 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314(e), 5316-5530, 5332(2) 
(2000), and 18 U.S.C. §§1956-1957, 1960 (2009)) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act]. Anti-
money laundering laws were expanded in 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, and 2004. 
History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FmCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/aml_ 
history.html (last visited May 20, 2012) (FinCEN is the U.S. financial intelligence unit); see 
also Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Criminal Law: The Tenuous Relationship Between the 
Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRJM. L. & 
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endorse the latest version of the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) 
Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering (F ATF 40 
Recommendations Y and accompanying Methodology for Assessment. 4 
CRIMINOLOGY 3ll, 338-69 (2003) (exploring the federal laws and regulations available to 
prosecute money laundering). The ED's efforts began in 1991 with its first anti-money laun-
dering Directive. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 (EC). They were 
expanded significantly with the second and third anti-money laundering Directives in 2001 
and 2004. Council Directive 2001/97/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 (EC); Council Directive 
2005/60/EEC, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 (EC); see also Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: 
Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying with Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18 
TRANSNAT'L L. 395, 408-10, 414 (2005) (discussing the development of anti-money launder-
ing law in the EU). The first multilateral convention including anti-money laundering provi-
sions came into force in 1988. U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion]. This was followed by conventions expanding anti-money laundering provisions. See, 
e.g., The Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. No. 141 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) 
[hereinafter Strasbourg Convention]; U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Sept. 29, 2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. The Financial Action Task Force published its 
first set of 40 Recommendations on money laundering in 1990. These original Recommenda-
tions were revised and expanded in 1996. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MONEY LAUNDERING 2 (June 28, 1996); see also FATF, FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2003) [hereinafter FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS). Following the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, the FA TF added 8 Special Recommendations against Terrorism 
Finance; a 9th Recommendation was added in 2004. History of the FATF, FATF, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutuslhistoryofthefatf/ (last visited May 21, 2012). Since 
the FATF's first set of 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering, the definition of finan-
cial institution has been extended, (and certain requirements have been extended to include 
some persons who are not financial institutions). In addition, rules on record-keeping have 
been tightened, but the general framework of client identification, recordkeeping, client 
monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities has not changed. Compare FATF 40 
REcoMMENDATIONS, supra, at 16 (defining financial institution as any person or entity en-
gaged in specific transactions, such as accepting deposits, lending, transfers, and others), 
with id. at 7 (obligating other institutions, such as casinos, real estate agents, dealers in pre-
cious metals, lawyers, and trust and company service providers, to adhere to the same stand-
ards). 
3 FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that 130 countries have en-
dorsed the 40 Recommendations). In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed 
the FATF 40 Recommendations (and the FATF VIII Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing (2001)), which were amended in 2004 to include Special Recommendation IX. 
IMF Advances Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance, IMF (Pub. Info. 
Notice No. 02/87, Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter IMF Pub. Notice], available at http://www.imf. 
org/extemal/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm; see also IMF, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE 
FA TF PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR 
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD (2002) [hereinafter FATF PLENARY 
MEETING], available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/110 802.pdf (pro-
posing endorsement of the FATF Recommendations to the IMF Executive Board). Because 
nearly every country in the world is a member of the IMF, this endorsement has significant 
resonance. IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, IMF, 
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Starting in 1990, these global standards have required financial institutions5 
to monitor the transactions of their customers, to examine unusual 
transactions to determine if they might involve the proceeds of crime6 and 
since 200 1-the financing of terrorism, 7 and to report any suspicious 
transactions to special government authorities known as financial 
intelligence units (FlUs). The Fills then analyze the reports (known as 
suspicious transaction reports (STRs)), along with other relevant data, and 
make recommendations to law enforcement as to which clients or 
transactions should be investigated. 8 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in governments 
greatly intensifying their anti-money laundering activities and prompted an 
intensified global effort against terrorism financing. 9 In 2002, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank adopted the FATF 40 
Recommendations and the eight new Special Recommendations on 
Terrorism Financing (Special Recommendations) as a world standard. 10 
They, along with the FATF and various regional anti-money laundering 
groups known as F ATF -Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs ), also began a joint 
global compliance program by assessing the extent to which individual 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (last visited May 21, 2012). More 
importantly, each member of the FATF and each of the eight FATF associate members and 
FA TF -style regional bodies has endorsed the F ATF 40 Recommendations and Special Rec-
ommendations on Terrorist Financing the as the global standard for anti- money laundering 
and combating the financing of terrorism. See Financial Action Task Force, Members and 
Observers, IMF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited 
May 21, 20 12) (listing all members ofF ATF); see also PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE 
GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, at III-
7-III-13 (2d ed. 2006), available at http://zunia.org/uploads/media/knowledge/Reference 
_Guide_ AMLCFT _ 2ndSupplementl.pdf (summarizing F ATF' s mission and F ATF member 
obligations). 
4 See FATF, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FA TF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 73 (2009) [hereinafter 
METHODOLOGY] (listing the endorsing bodies, including the IMF, World Bank, and a number 
of regional financial interest groups). 
5 See generally FATF PLENARY MEETING, supra note 3 (detailing the development of the 
standards over time). 
6 See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7-8 (Recommendations 11-15 di-
recting financial institutions to be aware of certain types of suspicious transactions). 
7 See generally FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (2001) 
[hereinafter SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS] (proposing recommendations focused on terrorism 
for addition to the original recommendations). 
8 SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3-5. 
9 Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance 
and Offshore Centers, 88 N.C.L. REV. 501, 564 (2010). 
10 IMF Pub. Notice, supra note 3. 
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countries were implementing those standards. 11 Failure to implement the 
standards adequately can result in a broad application of sanctions or 
countermeasures, including bans on doing business with financial 
institutions located within the borders of non-complying jurisdictions. 12 As 
a result, millions of STRs have been forwarded to FIU s by financial 
institutions throughout the world, although how many have resulted in 
further investigation, prosecution, and conviction is not publically 
available. 13 
The F ATF's 40 Recommendations and the Special 
Recommendations are designed to "provide an enhanced, comprehensive 
and consistent framework of measures for combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing." 14 Together they cover, among other things, the 
criminalization of money laundering and terrorism fmancing, the freezing 
and seizing of criminal proceeds and terrorism funds, key preventive 
measures against laundering and terrorism financing for financial 
institutions and other institutions subject to preventive measures, FIUs, and 
11 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 2-3 (stating that a uniform system of assessment, in-
cluding a single assessment methodology, was agreed to by the IMF, the World Bank and the 
FATF in 2002). IMF assessment reports can be found at Detailed Assessment Reports, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/ns/cs.aspx?id=175 (last updated May 24, 2012). World Bank 
assessments can be found at Financial Market Integrity - Assessments, WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/Y902MD2ZLO (last visited May 24, 2012). These bodies and each 
of the eight FATF associate members and FATF-style regional bodies (many of which are 
undertaken with the participation of the IMF and World Bank) use the uniform assessment 
system. FATF assessments can be found at Mutual Evaluations, FATF, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/ (last visited May 24, 2012) and those of regional bodies 
can be found at Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
- Assessments, IMF, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.htm#reports (last 
visited May 24, 2012). 
12 See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9 (in particular, Recommendation 21 
stating: "[ f]inancial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and 
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries 
which do not or insufficiently apply the FA TF Recommendation ... Where such a country 
continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FA TF Recommendations, countries 
should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures."). For example, under Title III, Sec. 
31l(a) of the USA Patriot Act, if a financial institution is operating with a jurisdiction out-
side of the U.S. and there is concern about that jurisdiction's money laundering efforts, the 
Secretary of the Treasury "may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or main-
taining in the U.S. of a correspondent account or payable- through account by any domestic 
financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking insti-
tution." USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 301 (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5) (2004)). 
13 E-mail from Boudewijn Verhelst, President, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units, to author (Feb. 27, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Verhelst e-mail]. 
14 F ATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2 at 2. 
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international cooperation. 15 The 40 Recommendations have included similar 
preventive measure requirements since the original 1990 draft. 16 In effect, 
these Recommendations divide the responsibility for preventing and 
uncovering money laundering between the private and public sector. 
15 The FA TF 40 Recommendations are broken down into 4 groups. First is Group A, titled 
"Legal Systems," which includes the "scope of the criminal offence of money laundering" 
and "provisional measures and confiscation." Id. at 3--4. Second is Group B, titled "Measures 
to be Taken by Financial Institutions and [certain] Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing," which includes prohibition on shell 
banks, customer due diligence and record-keeping (including client identification and trans-
action monitoring), reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance (including internal 
training and audit programs), other measures to deter money laundering and terrorist financ-
ing (including sanctions for failure to comply with the Recommendations), measures to be 
taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FA TF Recom-
mendations, and regulation and supervision. Id. at 4--10. Third is Group C, titled "Institution-
al and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terror-
ism Financing," which includes competent authorities and their powers and resources (in-
cluding the establishment of a financial intelligence unit) and transparency of legal persons 
and arrangements. I d. at 10--12. Fourth is Group D, titled "International Co-operation," 
which includes international commitment to implement various treaties, mutual legal assis-
tance and extradition, and other forms of co-operation. !d. at 12-14. The IX Special Recom-
mendations include: (1) ratification and implementation of UN instruments; (2) criminalizing 
the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering; (3) freezing and confiscating 
terrorist assets; ( 4) reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism (also required in 
Recommendation 13); (5) international co-operation, (6) alternative remittance systems; (7) 
wire transfers; (8) non-profit organizations; and (9) cash couriers. See generally FATF, IX 
SPECIAL RECOMMEND A T!ONS (20 1 0) [hereinafter IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
16 Since 1990, there has been a progressive expansion of those persons who must follow 
the "preventive measures" provisions in the FATF 40 Recommendations. See FATF, FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1990), available at http:/ /www.accessbankplc.com/Library/Documents/ 
Download%20Centre/FATF.pdf; see also FATF, 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 1295 (1996), avail-
able at http://www.fincen.gov/news _room/rp/files/fatf_ 40 _recommendations.pdf. The cur-
rent definition of financial institutions includes any person who engages in acceptance of 
deposits and other repayable funds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer of 
money or value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks, 
traveler's checks, money orders and bankers' drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees 
and commitments; trading in: money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs, derivatives 
etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable securities, 
commodity futures trading; participation in securities issues and the provision of financial 
services related to such issues; individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping 
and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise invest-
ing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; underwriting and 
placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance; and money and currency 
changing. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 65-66. Since 2003, most of the preventive 
measures prescribed for financial institutions have been extended to certain designated non-
financial businesses and persons including: casinos (which also includes internet casinos); 
real estate agents; dealers in precious metals; dealers in precious stones; lawyers; notaries; 
other independent legal professionals and accountants; and trust and company service pro-
viders. !d. at 64. 
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B. Financial Sector Role 
1. Overview 
F ATF Recommendations 5 through 13, plus 21 and 22 (and the 
relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of 
compliance) set out the part of the preventive measures system that applies 
financial institutions. Unfortunately these Recommendations are not a 
model of clarity and are not easy for non-experts to comprehend.17 
However, they are designed to create a five-part requirement: 18 fmancial 
institutions must (1) establish and maintain customer identity (including 
beneficial owner and controller of the legal title holder of the account); (2) 
create and maintain an up-to-date customer profile; 19 (3) monitor 
transactions to see if they fit with the customer profile of transactions that 
are legitimate; (4) if not, examine further any such transaction to see if it 
might represent the proceeds of crime or fmancing of terrorism, including 
by examining the source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the 
FIU, along with a description of why the financial institution believes that 
the transaction is suspicious. Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 34 
(and the relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for 
assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory system to ensure 
that the fmancial institution comply with their preventive measures 
requirements and the criminal investigation and prosecution system. 
17
c See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the 
Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determi-
nants in International Law, 31 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 137, 159-60 (2011) (describing the 
sometimes contradictory and confusing language in the Recommendations). In 2002 an at-
tempt was made by the IMF to reorganize the preventive measures Recommendations into a 
more accessible, coherent whole. However, in a series of meetings in 2002 delegations to the 
FATF rejected the effort. 
18 A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the U.N. Office on 
Drugs ands Crime, the World Bank, and the IMF has drafted a model regulation for the pre-
vention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of a model law on anti-
money laundering and terrorism financing. The Model Regulation implements these FATF 
Recommendations based on the regulatory frameworks in the U.K., Canada, Australia, and 
Hong Kong. Article S.l(a}-(e) of the Model Regulation outlines CDD as the "(a) identifica-
tion of customers, including beneficial owners; (b) gathering of information on customers to 
create a customer profile; (c) application of acceptance policies to new customers; (d) 
maintenance of customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) monitoring of cus-
tomer transactions." Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N. Office on Drugs and 
Crime). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being "of sufficient nature and detail ... to 
monitor the customer's transactions, apply enhanced customer due diligence where neces-
sary, and detect suspicious transactions." Id. 
19 If a new customer profile suggests that the customer is opening an account with pro-
ceeds of crime, the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. I d. 
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The financial institution's role focuses on three basic objectives. 
The first is to help exclude from the fmancial system possible criminal and 
terrorist elements. The F ATF 40 and Special IX do this by making financial 
institutions identify and profile potential-and, periodically, existing-
customers to screen out possible criminals and terrorists. 20 The second is to 
make available to law enforcement financial information that can be used in 
criminal investigations or as evidence in a prosecution. The F ATF 40 + 
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to maintain records of the 
identity of all clients and their transactions.21 The third is to identify 
customers who might be criminals or terrorists so that law enforcement can 
decide whether to investigate and prosecute such persons. The F ATF 40 + 
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to monitor customer 
transactions based on their profiles and report to law enforcement those that 
raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing are involved. 
The US. largely complies with these requirements through 
statutory and regulatory measures (although the US does not extend these 
requirements to all those designated non-financial businesses and persons as 
defined in the Methodology), as well as through guidance issued to financial 
institutions.22 The KU also largely complies through both Directives 
20 See infra Part LR2, notes 38-48, and accompanying text. 
21 See infra Part I.B2, notes 49-51, and accompanying text 
22 See generally Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2 (requiring U.S. institutions to assist U.S. 
government agencies in the detection and preventions of money laundering). See M. 
MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31208, INTERNATIONAL MONEY 
LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING ACT OF 200l,T!TLE III OF P.L. 
107-56 (2001) (providing an overview of the Patriot Act's role in counterterrorism via anti-
money laundering efforts); FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORlSM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
83-226 (2006) (describing the laws and regulations in the U.S. pertaining to money launder-
ing and evaluating the quality of these standards) [hereinafter U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT]; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn't Just Watching You, He's Also Wasting Your Tax 
Payer Dollars: An Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 
56 RUTGERS L. REv. 573, 586-7 (2004) (describing the relevant sections of the Patriot Act 
and their impact on financial institutions). Regulations on customer identification are found 
in 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006). 31 U.S.C. § 5314(b) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
to require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. It is implemented at 21 
C.F.R. § 21.110 (2006). There are similar customer identification rules for securities broker-
dealers, mutual funds, and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in com-
modities. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.122 (2006); see also Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering, NOTICE TO MEMBERS No. 02-21, at 5-7 
(2002) (providing guidance to financial institutions in the implementation of anti-money 
laundering protocol); Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering 
Customer Identification Programs for Brokers/Dealers, NoncE TO MEMBERS No. 03-34, at 
347 (2003) (notifying members of the implementation of the Patriot Act as pertains to finan-
cial institutions). Under 31 C.F.R. § 103.137(c) (2006), a life insurer is required to have 
policies and procedures for obtaining "all relevant customer-related information necessary 
for an effective anti-money laundering program." 
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(essentially instructions to members of the Union) and implementing 
legislation at the member state level.23 The language used to implement the 
Recommendations is often similar to that found in the Recommendations.24 
2. Details 
F ATF Recommendation 5 requires that fmancial institutions 
identify their customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer 
account, which, in the case of legal persons and other legal arrangements 
such as trusts, includes taking "reasonable measures" to identify the 
physical persons who own or control the legal person. 25 Recommendation 
12 extends these requirements to certain designated non-financial 
businesses and persons (known as DNFBPs; for purposes of this Report the 
term "fmancial institution" should be read to include DNFBPs), which 
include. casinos (which often deal with cash that can be exchanged for chips 
and vice versa, providing laundering opportunities), real estate agents (in 
part because real estate is often of high value, it is often used as an 
investment vehicle by launderers), dealers in precious metals (included for 
similar reasons, plus the fact that the ownership of precious metals can be 
easily transferred), lawyers, notaries, and persons who assist' in the setting 
up of trusts and companies (these are often professionals who assist 
launderers in hiding assets).26 Although neither the Recommendation itself 
nor the Methodology uses the term "client profile," Recommendation 5 
requires that the fmancial institutions determine the purpose and intended 
nature of the business relationship of a potential-and periodically, of a 
23 Sorcher, supra note 2 at 408-10 (discussing the various Directives already applied and 
the structure of the proposed "Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive"). 
24 Compare F ATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5 (Recommendation 5 describ-
ing the measures to be taken in performing customer due diligence), with Money Laundering 
Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, art. 5 (U.K.) (adopting language almost identical to FATF 
Recommendation 5 in describing the measures to be taken for customer due diligence). Fur-
thermore, in the course of their assessment work for the IMF and the World Bank, research-
ers have reviewed implementing statutory and regulatory language in The British Virgin 
Islands, Hong Kong, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the U.K. and often 
found language nearly identical to that used in the Recommendations and Methodology. This 
may be due to decisions to enact the two verbatim so as to ensure that legislation complies 
with the standard. 
25 FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5-6 (Recommendation 5 requiring cus-
tomer due-diligence and record-keeping). The Methodology allows an exception from this 
latter requirement in the event the legal person is a public company. METHODOLOGY, supra 
note 4, at 17-18. 
26 FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. Recommendation 22 requires that the 
principles applicable to financial institutions also be applied to branches and majority owned 
subsidiaries located abroad. I d. at 9. 
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current-client and a "knowledge of the customer, their business and risk 
profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.'m 
This serves two purposes. If a financial institution cannot establish a 
potential client's identity and profile, it must terminate the business 
relationship.28 Second, the fmancial institution can measure future 
transactions of accepted clients against this baseline of normal or typical 
transactions. Specifically, financial institutions must "obtain information on 
the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship . . . [and] 
conduct ongoing customer due diligence on the business relationship," and 
undertake a "scrutiny of transactions under taken throughout the course of 
th[ e] relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are 
consistent with the institution's knowledge of the customer, its business and 
risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds."29 If the 
fmancial institution cannot comply, the financial institution should 
terminate business relations or not undertake a transaction. 30 Second, the 
client profile allows the financial institutions to monitor client transactions 
to see if they are unusual compared with the profile. 
A key development in the 2003 Recommendations was the adoption 
of an optional risk-based approach for certain preventive measures. 
According to the Financial Action Task Force, the adoption of risk 
sensitivity "involve[ s] identifying and categorizing money laundering risks 
and establishing reasonable controls based on risks identified .... "31 This 
risk-based program, which apparently does not apply to terrorism financing, 
contrasts with the previous program, in which each of the FATF 
Recommendations was to be implemented objectively regardless of relative 
risk levels.32 FATF Recommendation 5 now allows fmancial institutions to 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 Id. at 9. Recommendation 18 also forbids financial institutions to transact business with 
shell banks and "guard against" establishing relations with those that do. Id. 
29 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17. 
30 !d. at 19. It should also consider filing a suspicious transaction report to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit, but is not required to do so. FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 
8. 
31 FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 2 (2007) [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE ON RBA]. The U.S. has adopted a risk-based system. See FED. FIN. INST. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION 
MANUAL 11-27, I-1, K-1, M-1, M-1-2 (2006) [hereinafter FFIEC MANUAL] (describing 
implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act with a risk-based approach). 
32 GUIDANCE ON RBA, supra note 31, at 2. According to the F ATF, the new focus on risk 
allows financial institutions and supervisory authorities to be more efficient and effective in 
their use of resources and minimize burdens on customers, although it does not say exactly 
how. Id. During the years when the FATF was considering the adoption of a risk based-
approach disagreement tended to arise at between those FATF delegates from a law en-
forcement background and those from a regulatory, particularly bank regulatory background, 
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determine the extent of such measures on a risk -sensitive basis, depending 
on the type of customer, business relationship, or transaction.33 Other 
Recommendations address new technologies and reliance on third parties 
for due diligence. 34 
Recommendation 10 requires that financial institutions maintain 
customer records, including identification and transaction records sufficient 
to permit reconstruction of individual transactions for evidence in a 
prosecution, and that these records be maintained for at least five years and 
be available for inspection by competent authorities. 35 Special 
Recommendation VII provides more detail with respect to wire transfers. 36 
with the latter arguing in favor of a risk-based approach. In general, the banking regulators 
were used to dealing with concepts of risk while law enforcement was not. "Supervisors 
must be satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk man-
agement process (including Board and senior management oversight) to identifY, evaluate, 
monitor and control or mitigate all material risks." BASEL CoMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl29.pdf. 
33 FA TF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 19. The Methodology goes on to provide 
certain examples of higher risk categories. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17. Recommen-
dation 6 singles out a particular category of customers, those individuals who are or have 
been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, as well as family mem-
bers or close associates, which are termed politically-exposed persons. FATF 40 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 22. It requires financial institutions and DNFBP to have 
risk management systems to determine if customers are politically-exposed persons and to 
take reasonable measures to establish the "source of wealth and source of funds" and to 
"conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship." In other words, if a 
customer is a politically exposed person the financial institution and certain others must 
always take measures to establish the source of funds. Recommendation 6 was added in 2003 
to address a perceived public backlash against developed country banks that had laundered 
the proceeds of developed country dictators. !d. at 5-6. 
34 Under FATF Recommendation 8, "[f]inancial institutions should pay special attention 
to any money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies," and 
recommends that they have "policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks 
associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions." Id. at 6. FATF Rec-
ommendation 9 permits financial institutions to rely on third parties to undertake some due 
diligence measures in certain cases. !d. 
35 Id. at 7. FATF Recommendation 10 also suggests that financial institutions keep and 
maintain client account records, and that they "must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of 
individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to 
provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity." !d. Competent authori-
ties are defined as "all administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with com-
bating money laundering and terrorist financing, including the FIU and supervisors." 
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 62. An FlU is a financial intelligence unit. !d. at 66. 
36 See IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3 (recommending that countries 
take actions to enhance their security and gain meaningful originator information for wire 
transfers). 
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This, along with Recommendation 5, allows investigative and prosecutorial 
authorities to "follow the money" of criminal suspects. 37 
Recommendation 11 requires that "[f]inancial institutions pay 
special attention to complex, unusual large and all unusual patterns of 
transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose."38 
Financial institutions must examine, "as far as possible," the background 
and purpose of such transactions, and establish their fmdings in writing.39 
This requirement is separate from Recommendation 5 's requirement for 
ongoing customer due diligence with respect to "scrutiny of transactions."40 
Recommendation 13 requires that a financial institution report promptly to 
the governmental Fill if it "suspects" or has "reasonable grounds" to 
suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity. 41 The 
Methodology describes this as filing an STR.42 Key to the subject of this 
Report, Special Recommendation IV further requires financial institutions 
to file reports if they suspect terrorism fmancing. 43 
Most jurisdictions provide a template or form for filing STRs (or, in 
the U.S., Suspicious Activity Reports: SARs). The U.S. form requires, in 
addition to financial institutions, client, and transaction identification 
information that a box be checked to characterize the suspicious activity. 
Options include "structuring/money laundering" and "terrorism financing," 
as well as various boxes relating to fraud, embezzlement, and identity 
37 FA TF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4-5 (proposing identification require-
ments that will allow institutions and governments to more easily trace accounts). The U.S. 
has put in place similar rules. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at 31, 118-22, 261-64 (detail-
ing identification procedures for different types of customers in order to ensure accounts and 
transactions are traceable). 
38 FA TF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. 
39 !d. at 5, 7 (Recommendations 5 and 10 listing necessary information to be kept on file 
and how files should be managed). 
40 !d. at 5; see also METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25 ("A fmancial institution should be 
required by law or regulation to report to the FlU (a suspicious transaction report-STR) 
when it suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a crimi-
nal activity."). 
41 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25. 
42 !d. 
43 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 2. Recommendation 21 requires that 
financial institutions and DNFBP pay "special attention" to business relationships and trans-
actions with persons from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FA TF Recommen-
dations (although it does not say how this is to differ from non-special (or average) atten-
tion). FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9. This Recommendation raises the 
costs of doing business with persons from countries that do not sufficiently apply the Rec-
ommendations as a whole. This creates a financial incentive for countries to implement the 
Recommendations, especially as detemuned by assessment reports. !d. 
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theft.44 Also required is a narrative description of the suspected violation, 
including what is unusual, irregular, and suspicious about the reported 
transaction. 45 
It is these Recommendations, along with Recommendation 5, that 
create the system requiring financial institutions to monitor customer 
transactions based on their profiles and to report to law enforcement those 
that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing might be 
involved. Recommendation 15 requires financial institutions to develop 
internal policies, procedures, and controls for anti-money laundering 
programs, including compliance management arrangements, internal train-
ing, and audit capacities.46 Recommendation 16 extends most of these 
requirements to the same designated non-financial businesses and persons 
as found in Recommendation 12, although not all.47 
An essential aspect of this part of the preventive measures system 
should be emphasized. Financial institutions must design and implement 
their own systems.48 While the five-part requirement describes what these 
44 FinCEN, Suspicious Activity Report, Part III (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fin 
cen.gov/forms/files/f9022-4 7 _ sar-di.pdf. 
45 !d. Part V. 
46 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 8. 
47 !d. at 8. Recommendation 14 protects financial institutions from any liability for filing 
suspicious activities reports and prohibits the reporting person from revealing that such re-
ports are being made (known as the prohibition against tipping off). U.S. rules comply with 
these requirements, except that DNFBP include casinos only. See 31 C.F .R. § 103.18-19 
(2006) (describing the types of transactions that require reporting, including funds derived 
from illegal activity or transactions that have no business or apparent lawful purpose). 
48 See, e.g., FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4 (Recommendation 5 stating: 
"[f]inancial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures ... but may de-
termine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 5 
(Recommendation 6 stating that financial systems should "[h) ave appropriate risk manage-
ment systems ... . ")(emphasis added); id. at 6 (Recommendation 8 stating: "financial institu-
tions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated 
with non-face to face business relationships or transactions") (emphasis added); id. at 6 
(Recommendation 9 stating: "[a] financial institution should satisfY itself that the third party 
is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with [customer due 
diligence requirements] in line with Recommendations 5 and 10.") (emphasis added); id. at 7 
(Recommendation 10 stating: "records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individ-
ual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to pro-
vide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.") (emphasis added); id. 
("Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transac-
tions .... The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be 
examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities 
and auditors.") (emphasis added); id. at 8 (Recommendation 13 stating: "[i]f a financial 
institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a 
criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing it should be required to report promptly 
its suspicions. . . . ") (emphasis added); id. ("[ f]inancial institutions should develop pro-
gramDs against money laundering and terrorist financing ... [including] [t]he development 
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systems are supposed to accomplish, it does not provide any detail as to 
how they are supposed to do it. Financial institutions are not told how to 
implement those requirements. An exception to this is Recommendation 25, 
which requires that government authorities establish guidelines and provide 
feedback to assist financial institutions and others subject to preventive 
measures, "in particular m detecting and reporting susp1c10us 
transactions. "49 
Neither compliance reports nor sanctions reported by supervisory 
authorities discuss in any detail the design of compliance systems. 50 
Financial institutions also do not publicize exactly how they implement 
these requirements. 51 Clearly, monitoring of transactions to determine if 
they vary from the expected client profile is the first key. Such monitoring 
appears to be based first, as required by Recommendation 11, on whether a 
transaction (or series of transactions) differs in magnitude from that 
normally expected of the client, based on the client's profile. Further 
scrutiny of the transaction can determine if something else appears unusual, 
such as an unusual transferor or transferee. 
One aspect of successful transaction analysis is link analysis, a 
technique used to find associations within data that might have relevance to 
the particular research question. 52 Link analysis explores associations within 
collections of data.53 Increasing the number of data sets available increases 
the number and types of links that can be identified. There are a number of 
different types of data sets that could be helpful in money laundering or 
terrorism financing link analysis. First, personal and financial data 
(including personal and businesses names, addresses, phone numbers, 
of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate compliance management 
arrangements .... ") (emphasis added). 
49 !d. at 10. 
50 See id. (Recommendation 25 stating only that guidelines should be established, not what 
those guidelines should be). 
51 An important barrier to learning more about how firms actually implement their preven-
tive measures is a desire for protecting proprietary information in the context of competitive 
concerns, something researchers have learned from numerous interviews conducted with 
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S., Hong Kong, The British Virgin Is-
lands, and the Philippines over the past five years. See Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and 
Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF): Case Study, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc. 
com/lu/en/anti-money-laundering/case.jhtml (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing almost 
no detail on a preventive measures system recommended by an outside consultant). 
52 Cuellar, supra note 2, at 368-69. 
53 FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING 
SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 10 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news 
_room/rp/files/CBFTFS _ Complete.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC 
FUNDS]; see also Cuellar, supra note 2, at 368-69. Much of the infonnation in the following 
two paragraphs of text has been provided by Boudewijn Verhelst. Verhe!st e-mail, supra 
note 13. 
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names of beneficial owners and controllers, bank accounts, deposits, funds 
transfers) would link people and businesses through their financial 
transactions. For example, this can establish that person A has a relationship 
with company B and person C. 
Next, descriptive links can be established with databases that 
describe the type of business activities normally conducted by the persons 
within the link. Such data includes customer identification/profiles and 
other information such as that which is found in business directories like 
Dunn and Bradstreet. Links can also be made to data that include money 
laundering or terrorism financing indicators, such as law enforcement data, 
case files, or STRs, can also be made. 
Once such descriptive links are established, further analysis can 
help determine if a transaction between identified persons looks unusual or 
suspicious. For example, if person A has a terrorism-related record or has 
made past suspicious transactions, payments to company B or C could raise 
suspicion that payments might be related to terrorism financing. This 
suspicion could be raised further if person A owns or controls company B 
and company B itself has no known business, and if B itself is located in a 
jurisdiction where terrorism is known to be active. If C has a record as a 
terrorist or terrorist organization, a stronger suspicion might be raised that 
the payments were made to fmance terrorism. Obviously, the greater the 
amount of relevant data and data types, the more extensive will be the link 
analysis. However, financial institutions and DNFBPs are restricted in their 
access to some useful data sets. 
Such use of descriptive links and analysis is also described as data 
mining and the use of red flags. 54 Such "red flags" or "indicators" are based 
on laundering or terrorism financing typologies. Such typologies are those 
typically provided by the FATF or local competent authorities (sometimes, 
they result from international financial institutions' own FIU efforts). 
Without such typologies it is difficult for financial institutions to know if a 
transaction or series of transaction is, in fact, an indicator of laundering or 
terrorism financing. 
Some financial institutions contract out some of their customer 
identification and client monitoring programs to third-party service 
providers. A review of some of their programs provides some insight into 
services offered. For example, some firms assist in customer identification 
and profiling by providing a risk-screening service to check individual or 
entity names against a comprehensive data set.55 Firms can also supply 
54 G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan & Subhrangshu Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Com-
bat Money Laundering, Part 2, INFO. MGMT. (Oct. 1, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.infor 
mation-management.com/specialreports/20071 009/1 093416-l.html?zkPrintable=true. 
55 E.g., WORLD-CHECK ONLINE, http://www.world-check.com/ (last visited May 22, 2012). 
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transaction monitoring services. One firm "monitors and detects" suspicious 
transactions "across all business lines" using "a fuily integrated dynamic 
and adaptive multidimensional intelligent engine [which] detects suspicious 
activities."56 This is accomplished using "risk modeling" and "risk-based 
algorithms" to "analyze and investigate suspicious activities effectively and 
efficiently."57 Presumably, they use link analysis combined with red-flag 
analysis to help determine which transactions warrant the filing of a report. 
C. Public Sector Role 
Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 32 (and the relevant 
materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance) 
address both the supervisory system-to ensure private sector compliance 
with its preventive measures requirements-and the criminal investigation 
and prosecution system for state law enforcement authorities.58 The public 
sector's role focuses on three basic objectives. The first objective is to 
ensure the private sector's compliance with their preventive measure 
responsibilities. Essentially, governmental authorities must supervise and 
regulate financial institutions to ensure compliance. This must include both 
guidance and examination functions, including the potential application of 
sanctions. The second objective is to ensure that STRs lead to the 
investigation of appropriate cases of suspected crime and terrorism. 
Essentially, a FIU receives and analyzes these reports along with other key 
information. It then decides which should be further investigated, and it 
forwards them to the appropriate government agency (typically the police). 
The FIU then decides, sometimes in consultation with state prosecutors, 
whether and how to go forward. 
Recommendation 25 requires that government authorities establish 
guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions "in detecting 
and reporting suspicious transactions."59 The Methodology goes further by 
56 Press Release, GlobalVision Systems, Inc., American Bankers Association Endorses 
PATRIOT OFFICER® as #1 AML/BSA Solution (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.gv-systems. 
com/20 1 0/06/08/ american -bankers-association-endorses-patriot-officer%C2%AE-as-1-amlbs 
a-solution/ [hereinafter ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®]. See generally PATRIOT 
OFF!CER®for Banks, GLOBAL VISION SYSTEMS, INC., http://www.gv-systems.com/products-
solutions/patriot-officer-for-banks/ (last visited June 11, 2012) (providing anti-money laun-
dering and anti-terrorist financing monitoring software designed to comply with the USA 
Patriot Act and other anti-laundering regulations). 
57 ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®, supra note 56. 
58 Recommendations 18 and 19 are listed under the preventive measures section of the 
F ATF Recommendations; 26 through 32 are under "C. Institutional and Other Measures 
Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Competent 
authorities, Their Powers and Resources." FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9-
11. 
59 !d. at 10. 
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stating that authorities should provide a description of money-laundering 
and terrorism-financing techniques and methods and any additional 
measures to ensure that the systems are implemented by financial 
institutions.60 This includes information on current techniques, methods and 
trends (typologies);61 examples of actual money laundering cases; and case-
by-case feedback, including if an STR was found to relate to a legitimate 
transaction. 
In order to ensure compliance with the preventive measures, 
Recommendation 23 requires that financial institutions be subject to 
adequate regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of the 
preventive measures,62 while Recommendations 29 and 17 require that 
supervisors have adequate powers to ensure compliance including the 
imposition of sanctions.63 Recommendation 26 requires that countries 
establish an FIU64 to serve as a national center for the receipt, analysis, and 
60 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 33. 
61 See Methods and Trends, F ATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/ (last 
visited May 22, 2012). 
I d. 
The methods used for laundering money and the fmancing of terrorism are in con-
stant evolution. As the international financial sector implements the FATF stand-
ards, criminals must find alternative channels to launder proceeds of criminal activ-
ities and finance illicit activities. The F ATF identifies new threats and researches 
money laundering and terrorist financing methods. FATF Typologies reports de-
scribe and explain their nature, thus increasing global awareness and allowing for 
earlier detection. 
62 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9-10. Recommendation 24 extends this 
requirement to designated non-financial businesses and persons. I d. at 10. 
63 Id. at 9, 11. U.S. laws also comply with these requirements. See 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2004) 
(addressing "financial recordkeeping and reporting of currency and foreign transactions"); 
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (1980) (requiring recordkeeping of financial transactions). 
The U.S. has levied significant fines, as well as other supervisory and regulatory orders, 
against financial institutions and casinos. See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the 
Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1361, 1414-15 (2007). 
Since September 11, FinCEN has imposed a staggering number of fines on banks 
for failing to meet its reporting requirements. Moreover, those fines have been ex-
traordinarily large. ABN AMRO, a large European bank, has been hit with a $30 
million fine (and more from state regulators). Western Union has also been hit with 
a $30 million fine for its record-keeping failures. And the Department of Justice 
has brought criminal prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which re-
sulted in a $50 million civil monetary penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in 
combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank, which put the bank out of 
business. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
64 FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10-11. The line between what some 
countries formally refer to as their financial intelligence unit and other law enforcement 
agencies is often blurry. This Report refers to the financial intelligence unit using a function-
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dissemination of STRs and other information regarding potential money 
laundering or terrorist financing. It further states that the FlU should have 
timely access, directly or indirectly, to the financial, administrative, and 
law-enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its 
functions, including the analysis of STRs. 65 Recommendation 10 states that 
competent authorities (including Fills) should have access to records kept 
by financial institutions and DNFBPs.66 Finally, Recommendation 40 states 
that countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the 
widest possible range of international cooperation to their foreign 
counterparts, including information relating to money laundering, provided 
that controls and safeguards are in place to ensure that information 
exchanged is used only in a manner consistent with obligations concerning 
privacy and data protection.67 The Methodology further states that Fills 
should be authorized to allow foreign intelligence units to search their own 
databases, including law enforcement databases, subject to confidentiality 
safeguards limiting the use of the data. 68 This is the only substantive 
Recommendation relating to FIUs.69 
al definition. See What is an FJU?, THE EGMONT GROUP FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, 
http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/what-is-an-fiu (last visited May 22, 2012) (describing the 
different types of FlUs); The Egmont Group, The Egmont Definition of a Financial Intelli-
gence Unit 1-2 (interpretive note, last visited May 22, 2012), available at http://www.eg 
montgroup.org/library/dowuload/8 (providing a functional definition of FlU not cabined to 
any particular sort oflaw enforcement). 
65 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10-11. For example, FinCEN has access 
to numerous databases. These include several databases of criminal reports sourced from the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's TECS II system, the FBI's National Criminal 
Information Center, the Drug Enforcement Administration's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
Information and NDIC Systems, the U.S. Secret Service database, and the U.S. Postal In-
spection Service. It also has access to the Office of Foreign Assets Control's list of Specially 
Designated Nationals, the Social Security Administration's Death Master File, and the State 
Department's list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also has access to com-
mercial database services from organizations such as Dun & Bradstreet, LEXIS/NEXIS, and 
credit bureaus as well as commercially available lists of "Politically Exposed Persons." Fin-
CEN also maintains its owu database of investigations and queries conducted through Fin-
CEN's systems. FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS, supra note 53, at 9-10. 
66 F ATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. 
67 Jd.at13-14. 
68 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 46. 
69 See generally FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 13. The draft methodology 
included a significant number of criteria spelling out in detail the duties of financial intelli-
gence units, including most of those described in infra notes and accompanying text. How-
ever, during a meeting in Basel in February, 2002 representatives of the Egmont Group, an 
informal association of financial intelligence units, objected to the spelling out in such detail 
of the purposes and activities of FIU s because of the difficulty of finding consensus on such 
a large amount of detail from such a large group. Nevertheless, the representatives largely 
concmTed that the criteria in the methodology described an effective financial intelligence 
unit. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 38 (2002). The U.S. largely complies with these re-
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Dividing the task of determining suspicious and really suspicious 
transactions between the private sector and public FlUs usually begins with 
the receipt of an STR, after which the FlU engages in a two-part analysis. In 
the first part, known as "tactical analysis," the FlU looks for additional 
information on the persons and transactions involved or other elements 
involved in a particular case to provide the basis for further analysis. 70 A 
key element of such tactical analysis is link analysis, which has been 
discussed at length above in the context of transaction monitoring and 
suspicious transaction reporting. Financial intelligence units typically have 
available various types of data, including those publicly available databases 
to which the private sector has access. An FlU can also have access to 
nonpublic databases such as tax records, police records, immigration and 
customs records, vehicle registries, and supervisory fmdings, as well as 
investigation reports for ongoing investigations, criminal records (which are 
nonpublic in many countries), currency transaction reports, currency and 
monetary instrument reports, and related-party data (same address or 
telephone number, known associates, etc.).71 
Following tactical link analysis, the FlU typically undertakes 
operational analysis. Operational analysis uses tactical information to 
formulate different hypotheses on the possible activities of the suspect to 
produce operational intelligence for use by investigators. It uses: 
[A ]11 sources of information available to the FlU to produce activity 
patterns, new targets, relationships among the subject and his or her 
accomplices, investigative leads, criminal profiles, and-where possible-
indications of possible future behavior. One of the techniques of 
operational analysis used in some FlUs is financial profiling. 72 
Based on such analysis, the FlU may or may not disseminate a report for 
further investigation.73 In recommending an SAR for further investigation, 
FlUs may include a description of what they had learned from these 
different types of analysis. This is often called "actionable intelligence" that 
can assist law enforcement in conducting a further investigation. 
Another important function of the FlU is strategic analysis, or the 
development of relevant knowledge on laundering or terrorism-fmancing 
techniques. Examples include the identification of evolving criminal 
patterns in a particular group or the provision of broad insights into 
quirements. See U.S. MUTUAL EvALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 226-40 (describing the 
U.S.laws that fulfill FlU obligations). 
70 See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-5-6 (describing the analytical role of FlUs); see also 
IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 57-58 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, FlUs]. 
71 V erhelst e-mail, supra note 13. 
72 IMF, FlUs, supra note 70, at 60. 
73 Id. at61. 
2012] TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS 785 
emerging patterns of criminality, including transactions particular to a given 
group, ideology or geographic location. 74 The Fill can then use these for its 
own operational analysis of STRs through linking as well as to develop 
guidelines, typologies etc. for use by financial institutions.75 This generally 
follows the system used by FinCEN in the U.S.76 
II. DETECTION OF TERRORISM FINANCING 
A. Overview 
As discussed above, the F ATF adopted the Special 
Recommendations in November, 2001, after the previous month's terrorist 
attacks against the U.S. However, that the financing of terrorism should be 
so closely tied to anti-money laundering was by no means completely 
obvious. While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the original FATF 40 
made no reference to it. Anti-money laundering laws were designed to stop 
criminals from taking criminal proceeds and running them through the 
financial system in a series of transactions to hide their criminal origins 
and/or actual ownership. On the other hand, terrorism financing need not 
involve criminal origins but only a particular type of criminal destination: 
terrorism. 
Of course, there were some obvious connections. As discussed 
above, identifying the financial institution's clients was a key aspect of anti-
money laundering preventive measures. These measures could also be used 
to identify whether the client was a terrorist, provided of course that the 
financial institution or the authorities knew who the terrorists were. This 
proved to be a valuable avenue for combating terrorism-financing measures. 
Before the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council had passed resolutions 
requiring all states to freeze accounts held by members of al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban and had set up the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.77 
The Committee created a consolidated list of entities and officials 
associated with these organizations, as submitted by members. Subsequent 
74 See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3 (discussing definitions ofFIUs that emphasis speci-
ficity to each nation's needs and characteristics); see also IMF, FIUs, supra note 70, at 59-60 
(noting that unusual transactions develop the basis for further investigation by the financial 
intelligence units). 
75 IMF, FlUs, supra note 70, at 60. 
76 See generally U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 126-36 (discussing 
record keeping rules for the banking, securities, insurance, and money services business 
sectors to combat money laundering and requirements to report unusual, suspicious transac-
tions). 
77 S.C. Res. 1267, 'lf4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
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resolutions strengthened this original commitment-18 Resolution 13 73-
passed as a result of the 9/11 attacks-extended the requirement of states to 
freeze accounts to terrorists other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban.79 The 
General Assembly had also adopted a Convention on Suppression of 
Terrorism Financing, although it did not go into force until April, 2002.80 
The convention requires contracting states to take appropriate measures "for 
the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or 
allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist offenses as defined in the 
convention] as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for 
purposes of possible forfeiture."81 
Assuming that someone could come up with a list of possible 
terrorists, fmancial institutions could compare that list to their account 
holders to see ifthere was a match, much as they could now do with known 
criminals. However, as discussed above, the new anti-terrorism fmancing 
regime required fmancial institutions to profile clients and monitor 
transactions to see if they might have some involvement in the financing of 
terrorism, and to report those cases as well. When the F ATF first published 
its 40 Recommendations, fmancial institutions in .most F ATF member 
countries were in the process of implementing a client identification-, 
78 ld ~ 6; see also Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 
1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, U.N. SECURITY 
CoUNCIL, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ (last visited May 22, 2012) (explaining 
subsequent resolutions modified and strengthened policies by designating sanction measures 
to specific individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaeda). 
79 S.C. Res. 1373, ~ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
80 See generally International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Convention] 
(prohibiting the financing of terrorism). 
81 /d. art 8. The Treaty defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and: 
Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act. 
Id art. 2(1 )(b). The treaties listed in the Annex include unlawful seizure of aircraft, unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons (in-
cluding diplomatic agents), the taking of hostages, the unlawful acquisition or threat to nu-
clear material, unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation and 
against the safety of civil aviation, unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, 
unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf, and ter-
rorist bombings. ld Annex; see also G.A. Res. 164, Annex, U.N. Doc A/52/164 (Jan. 9, 
1998) (attaching the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings for 
adoption by the General Assembly). With certain limited exceptions in each convention, the 
terrorists must be nationals of a different state than the state in which the terrorist act took 
place. See Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 80, art. 3; see also G.A. Res. 
164, supra note 81, annex, art. 2. 
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profiling-, monitoring-, and STR-reporting system for criminal proceeds 
reflecting the system required by the FATF 40. But when the system was 
extended to terrorism financing, neither financial institutions nor their 
supervisors had much, if any, relevant experience. While they had not 
originally been in the business of finding criminal proceeds, at least 
financial institutions had years of learning how to do so, as well as 
considerable typology guidance from competent authorities, the FATF, and 
FSRBs. 
B. Terrorism Typologies/Indicators/Red Flags 
As discussed above, financial institutions implement their STR-
reporting requirements by, among other things, identifying clients 
(including determining exactly who they really are), creating client profiles, 
monitoring client transactions with respect to those profiles to identify large 
or unusual transactions, performing link analysis, and comparing 
transactions to known typologies of money laundering and terrorism to see 
if any red flags are raised. 
Such typologies are provided by domestic competent authorities, as 
well as by the FATF or FSRBs. But what are those terrorism typologies, 
indicators and red flags? 
Soon after the F ATF adopted the Special Recommendations, the 
F ATF Secretariat published Guidance for Financial Institutions in 
Detecting Terrorist Financing, stating that that "[i]t should be 
acknowledged ... that financial institutions will probably be unable to detect 
terrorist financing as such."82 While there was mention of charities as being 
of special concern, there was no attempt to tie these to any special type of 
charity, or to charities sending payments to locations known to have 
terrorism concerns. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
U.S.'s Staff Report on Terrorist Financing, published two years after the 
adoption of the Special IV, concluded that: 
[Financial institutions] can be most useful in the fight against terrorist 
financing by collecting accurate information about their customers and 
providing this information . . . to aid in terrorism investigations. . . . 
However, the requirement that financial institutions file SARs does not 
work very well to detect or prevent terrorist financing, for there is a 
fundamental distinction between money laundering and terrorist financing. 
82 FATF, GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN DETECTING TERRORIST FINANCING 3 
(2002). 
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Financial institutions have the information and expertise to detect the one 
but not the other. 83 
In its sixth report, the U.N. Security Council's Monitoring Team 
was not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of preventive measures in 
deterring terrorism financing, in part because of lack of guidance. "The 
volume of suspicious transaction reports has increased tremendously, 
though the procedure suffers from a lack of guidance as to what to look for. 
... Only a small proportion of the reports are related to terrorist financing 
and hardly any have been associated with Al-Qaida. "84 
Early in 2008, the F ATF released its most comprehensive report to 
date on terrorist financing. 85 The Report stated that "[ d]espite the challenge 
in developing generic indicators of terrorist financing activity financial 
institutions may nevertheless identify unusual characteristics about a 
transaction that should prompt the filing of a suspicious transaction 
report."86 However, the cases and examples dealt almost entirely with 
individuals or organizations identified as having terrorism connections 
rather than through terrorism financing indicators (including "media 
coverage of account holder's activities,"87 presumably when the media 
reveals that someone may be connected to terrorism in some way). The only 
uniquely terrorism financing indicators noted in the Report were charity and 
relief organizations sending to or receiving funds from "locations of specific 
concern." 
While there has so far been relatively little guidance to financial 
institutions as to indicators or typologies of greater risk of terrorism 
financing, they are still required to implement Special IV, VI, and VII. 
Anecdotal evidence gathered largely from . informal interviews with 
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S. has indicated that at 
least some financial institutions have implemented "defensive" systems 
based largely on whether a client or potential client is a charity that makes 
payments to charities based in terrorism "hot spots;" this includes not 
accepting the charity as a client or filing STRs after a charity makes any 
83 JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG, & SERENA WILLE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, 
STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 52-54 (2004). 
84 Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team, transmitted by 
letter dated Mar. 8, 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established 
pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) concerning AI-Qaeda and the Taliban 
and associated individuals and entities, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/2007/132 (Mar. 8, 2007). 
85 See generally F ATF, TERRORIST FINANCING (2008) (exploring issues of terrorist re-
quirements for fund, how terrorists raise and move fund, and the international response to 
terrorist financing). 
86 I d. at 29. 
87 !d. at31. 
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large transaction. If true, this would not only raise costs to financial 
institutions, but would also reduce financial services to needy clients. It 
would also suggest that financial institutions' STRs included at least a high 
number of false positives (and perhaps a high number of false negatives), 
which would raise costs to PIUs and law enforcement without improving 
capacity to deter or prevent terrorism financing. 
III. STUDY TO IDENTIFY TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS 
A. Overview 
This preliminary study on terrorism-related prosecutions in the U.S. 
was completed by Professor Richard Gordon of the Case Western Reserve 
University, with assistance from students at Case Western. It is to be used in 
the completion of a final report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern 
University and the Honorable Susan Eckert of Brown University, which will 
include cases from other jurisdictions, additional analytical discussion, and 
bibliographical material. 
The objective of the U.S. study is to identify red flags or indicators 
of terrorism that financial institutions can use in implementing their duties 
to monitor client transactions and report those that raise a suspicion of 
terrorism fmancing. The study research methodology included five steps: 
(1) We selected terrorism cases that were successfully prosecuted. 
(2) We examined those cases to determine which involved a 
transaction though a regulated financial institution, and we 
collected the relevant client identification, profiling, and 
transaction data. 
(3) We examined the data to identify any possible indicators of 
terrorism financing. 
( 4) We determined if any SARs were filed by financial institutions 
with respect to those transactions. We reviewed the SARs to see 
why they were filed, including by examining the SAR narrative 
to determine what, if any, additional information the reporting 
institution had uncovered. 
(5) Finally, we determined if FinCEN had referred the SAR for 
further investigation. 
While it was relatively easy to complete steps 1 and 2, difficulties 
arose with completing the other steps. In particular, with respect to step 3 it 
proved difficult to acquire actual records of most of the identified 
transactions and impossible to acquire client identifying and profiling 
information, although in a number of cases it proved possible to acquire 
sufficient descriptive information to make some tentative conclusions about 
possible indicators. With respect to step 4, while research was continuing, 
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FinCEN proposed a new regulation (which became final in December 2010) 
that changed previous law, which had permitted a financial institution to 
release an SAR, provided that it did not "tip off' persons involved in the 
suspicious transaction. (This would have been an impossibility in the cases 
we were reviewing because all the persons had already been prosecuted.) 
The new regulation made step 5 in our methodology impossible to 
implement. 
As a result, the findings of this study are more tentative than was 
expected at the outset. However, the study suggests some alternatives that 
might be pursued that could help rectify the deficiencies in the current study 
that arose due to the inability to implement steps 4 and 5. 
B. Steps 1 & 2: Terrorism Case Selection, Identification of those 
Involving Financial Transactions and Collection of Transaction 
Records 
In December, 2008, Jeffrey Breinholt88 of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) provided the project with a list of 230 U.S. cases that he, in 
consultation with and other DOJ officials had identified as involving a 
prosecution in which the U.S. alleged that the defendants(s) may have been 
involved in supporting terrorism or some form of terrorist activity. 89 This 
list did not include the 9/11 case, which had been reviewed extensively by 
the U.S. 9/11 Commission and which did not tum up any apparent 
terrorism-financing indicators. This list was supplemented in October, 2010 
with an additional thirty-three cases to bring the list up-to-date. 
By reviewing DOJ press releases, news stories, and published court 
opinions, researchers identified forty-seven cases as possibly involving 
terrorism financing. Each involved either deposit-taking institutions or 
money-transfer agents. Researchers then collected and reviewed relevant 
court documents that were either published or made available free of charge 
through the Internet. These often included pleadings and motions, including 
bills of indictment and requests for warrants, freezing orders, material 
witness orders, and supporting affidavits. On rare occasions, some evidence 
submitted during the trial was also located and reviewed. Of considerable 
help to locating such materials is The Nine Eleven Finding Answers 
Foundation (NEFA), which maintains a website that includes many 
publically available documents on terrorism-related criminal and civil 
88 Mr. Breinholt has been Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Section and Coordinator, Ter-
rorist Financing Task Force of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
89 In many of the prosecutions, charges were not brought for either terrorism or material 
support, but in all instances charges were brought for some other offence, including: making 
false statements; immigration fraud; money laundering (including structuring or operation or 
use of unlicensed MSBs); threats other than terrorist threats; hoaxes; and air violence. Mate-
rial witness orders that involved no criminal charge were also included. 
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cases.9° From the group of forty-seven, researchers identified thirty that 
might involve both terrorism financing and a regulated financial institution. 
For these cases, researchers attempted to collect and examine documents 
and evidence not published or available for free on the internet. 
Researchers first attempted to obtain copies of client identification, 
profiling information, and transaction records from the banks and transfer 
agents in question. However, these reporting persons refused to share such 
records, citing the expense involved in collecting and providing us with 
such information and the concern that doing so might breach FinCEN's 
SAR confidentiality rules.91 They made this later point even though we did 
not mention SARs themselves and even though no law or regulation made 
reference to the confidentiality of information that may have given rise to 
the filing of an SAR. 
Failing in this attempt, researchers then turned to records made 
available as evidence in prosecution of the terrorism cases. In theory, all 
publicly available case documents, including all evidence submitted for 
trial, can be obtained in two ways: (1) in hard copy from the relevant court 
(mostly for cases that are older than ten years); or (2) through the online 
federal court filing and retrieval system known as PACER. However, in 
many cases the number of pages of documents filed from beginning to end 
run to the tens of thousands. The court keeps a docket of filings for each 
case, but the docket entries themselves rarely identify exactly what kind of 
evidence, if any, is included in the filing. As a result, it becomes necessary 
to individually examine documents to identify those that relate to fmancial 
transactions. For documents filed with the court in hard copy, this requires 
physically visiting the court, requesting documents from the court clerk, and 
reviewing them on-site. For most relevant documents filed through PACER, 
this requires downloading each page at a cost of$ 0.10 per page. 
After attempting and failing to identify relevant documents by 
reviewing court dockets filed on PACER, researchers contacted via e-mail 
and telephone92 those DOJ personnel who prosecuted each case for 
assistance identifying relevant documents. Follow-up e-mails and telephone 
calls were made where appropriate. Prosecutors had to divert their time 
from other pressing work to assist researchers with work that would not (at 
90 See Featured Legal Cases, NINE ELEVEN FINDING ANSWERS [NEFA] FOUNDATION, 
http://nefafoundation.org//index.cfm?pageiD=29 (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing a 
portal to domestic criminal and civil and international cases on terrorism). 
91 Given the nature of the refusals given by the first few approached, researchers gave up 
without pursuing the rest, deeming any additional efforts to be pointless. 
92 Each e-mail described the nature and purpose of the project, summarized the available 
details of the case, and requested any information regarding financial transactions, especially 
PACER document numbers. 
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least directly) assist in the prosecution of cases, current or future. 93 Not 
surprisingly, in many instances prosecutors were not able to respond to 
requests for assistance.94 In many instances, prosecutors informed us that for 
various reasons (including decisions not to charge defendants with crimes 
requiring financial transaction evidence or the entrance of guilty pleas to 
such crimes prior to the introduction of evidence) no relevant documents 
were admitted into evidence, and therefore they could not be shared with 
researchers. As a result, only in a few cases have prosecutors been able to 
share with researchers actual documentary evidence of financial 
transactions. In those instances, however, thousands of pages representing 
tens of thousands of transactions have been provided. 
Of those thirty cases, researchers found sufficient fmancial 
information to draw conclusions in twenty-four. A description of these 
cases, and of the relevant information obtained with respect to financial 
transactions are included in the Annex. 
C. Step 3: Analysis ofTransactionsfor Indicators 
As discussed above, in order to determine if a transaction is 
suspicious it is necessary for the financial institution to identify and profile 
the client, to monitor the client's transactions, and to examine transactions. 
However, in the initial review of the thirty cases for evidence of suspicious 
transactions, it was not possible to consult client identification and profiling 
information. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of instances it was possible 
to take educated guesses, based on publicly available information 
concerning the client in question, to determine if payments would fit an 
assumed client profile as being legitimate. This is because most transactions 
fall into three types: (1) those that are too small to be consequential; (2) 
those that are consequential but that appear to be between individuals or 
entities with no obvious legitimate connection that would render the 
transaction suspicious; and (3) those that appear to be between individuals 
or entities with a legitimate reason to make the transaction. 
93 Case Western Reserve University researchers discussed this matter with a number of 
prosecutors. Some noted that while the results of our research project might help future fi-
nancial institution compliance officers and/or investigators in identifying terrorism financing 
suspects, the results would be unlikely to help those who ultimately prosecuted those cases. 
Some also suggested that they believed that, from their experience, there were no "terrorism 
indicators," and that the project was unlikely to be of any assistance to law enforcement. 
94 In a few instances prosecutors had left the DOJ for private practice. In these cases they 
did respond to e-mail inquiries but were unable to assist in finding relevant documents. 
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D. Step 4: Review any SARs Filed 
As discussed above, part of a reporting institution's preventive 
measures obligation is to examine any unusual transaction to determine if 
there is an actual suspicion that it concerns terrorism financing. Because the 
methods by which reporting persons implement these requirements are 
expensive and proprietary, they are understandably reticent to share any 
details. We sought instead to obtain copies of any SARs filed so that we 
could examine the narratives and determine if link analysis, reference to any 
publically available information on the clients, or typologies might have 
played a role in uncovering relevant indicator information. We were not 
successful. 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
states that "[t]he global war on terrorism and cutting off terrorist financing 
is a policy priority for the U.S. and its partners, working bilaterally and 
multilaterally through the U.N., the U.N. Security Council and its 
committees ... and other multilateral fora."95 Under § 5318(g) of the USA 
Patriot Act,96 a fmancial institution and its agents are prohibited from 
notifying any person who is the subject of an SAR either that an SAR was 
filed or of the circumstances surrounding the filing. Congress apparently 
included this provision in order to prevent the tipping off of launderers and 
terrorists, which could spoil any current or future investigation. There was, 
however, no prohibition on release of information that an SAR had been 
filed or of the SAR itself that applied to government authorities. The 
implementing regulations essentially restated the statutory language. 97 Also, 
courts had held that SARs were not strictly confidential and that disclosure 
of an SAR in a case where the subject of the report has already been 
convicted will not compromise an ongoing law enforcement investigation, 
or provide information to a criminal wishing to evade detection. 98 This was 
clearly the situation with respect to the cases we were investigating. 
Based on such policy, law, and precedent, researchers requested 
copies from the DOJ of any SARs filed with respect to the thirty cases that 
we had identified, but with any information concerning innocent persons 
redacted. Officials at the DOJ were sympathetic and prepared to release 
95 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 
7701, 118 Stat. 3638, 3858 (2004). 
96 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A) (2006). 
97 See 12 C.F.R. § 21.1l(k) (2011) (providing similar guidance in the administrative regu-
lation as in the enacting legislation). 
98 See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (noting 
that SAR disclosure poses a threat when a suspect is still at large); see also BizCapital & 
Indus. Corp. v. Comptroller of Currency, 467 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
SARs are not categorically privileged under certain circumstances). 
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redacted SARs to researchers, but then FinCEN issued a new regulation that 
prohibits private or public sector persons from revealing if an SAR was 
filed, or any contents of that SAR, to anyone in any circumstances.99 While 
there appears to be no statutory authority for such a regulation (and 
therefore that it may be ultra vires, the statute may therefore be invalid), its 
issuance prevented DOJ from releasing any redacted SARs to researchers. 
Because we were unable to review the SARs, it was impossible for 
researchers to obtain the information necessary to determine if financial 
institutions had in fact used their knowledge of customer information, 
customer transactions, and link analysis, typologies, etc. to conclude that a 
transaction was suspicious. It also made it impossible for researchers to 
determine ifFinCEN had referred such SARs to law enforcement for further 
investigation, or if they had added actionable intelligence to the SARs that 
would suggest either money laundering or terrorism fmancing. 
E. Response to New Regulation Preventing Implementation of Step 4 
While the new Regulation prevents both public and private sectors 
from revealing if SARs have been filed or the contents of those SARs, it 
also made clear that "[w]ith respect to the SAR confidentiality provisions 
only, institutions may disclose underlying facts, transactions, and 
documents for any purpose, provided that no person involved in the 
transaction is notified and none of the underlying information reveals the 
existence of an SAR."10° For this reason, fmancial institutions should no 
longer be concerned with SAR confidentiality issues, and they should only 
be concerned about the costs of releasing identification, profiling, and 
transaction documents. Financial institutions may, however, continue to be 
reticent about releasing any link analysis that might lead a reviewer to 
believe that an SAR had, in fact, been filed. 
In order to encourage reporting persons to release identification, 
profiling and transaction data with respect to the identified cases, 
researchers have approached a number of financial institutions and 
requested that they create a committee to assist the Counterterrorism Task 
Force in identifying terrorism fmancing methodologies (CACTF). The 
Committee would encourage reporting persons in question to release the 
relevant documents, and it would provide technical assistance where 
needed. We expect CACTF to be up and running by End May, 2011. 
99 See FinCEN; Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75 Fed. Reg. 75593, 
75598 (Dec. 3, 2010) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. § 103) (explaining exceptions for connect-
ed parties and certain other government officials). 
100 I d. (citations omitted). 
l ) 
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F. New Step 5: Review Documents released by Reporting Persons 
Researchers are working with the initial members of CACTF to 
plan a workshop sometime in the fall of 2011 to review any released 
documents. The workshop will include AMLICFT compliance officers from 
member banks. It is hoped that this conference will help deepen our 
understanding of the nature of the cases identified in this Report. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on assumptions concerning client identification and profiles, 
researchers examined transactions to determine if there was anything 
unusual in those transactions that would raise a suspicion of terrorism 
financing. In doing so, we did not indicate instances where a person was 
identifiable as a terrorist or terrorist organization, in that this was not an 
"indicator" but a fact. 
In the twenty-four cases where sufficient financial information was 
available to draw a conclusion, fourteen indicated instances of classic 
money laundering typologies, including placement, layering, integration, or 
an unlicensed money service business. Only three of these cases involved 
criminal proceeds, although an additional three appear to involve diversion 
of charitable donations to terrorists which could have, in effect, constituted 
theft of legitimate donations. In eight cases there was no suspicious 
transaction of any kind (other than a party to a transaction was a known 
terrorist), although in two of these, criminal proceeds were involved. Only 
one indicated a possible set of transactions that might be a unique indicator 
for terrorism financing. 
Terrorist financers appear to be using classic money laundering 
typologies regardless of whether they are trying to launder the proceeds of 
crime. It appears that they do so either to hide the origins of the funds or the 
recipient of the funds without leaving a directly traceable transaction 
between origin and recipient. In other words, they are acting in a fashion 
similar to that of former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, who used classic 
structuring transactions to hide that he was making payments to 
prostitutes. 101 
Therefore, simply by using standard anti-money laundering 
typologies financial institutions should have been able to identifY fourteen 
of the twenty-four instances of terrorism financing as being suspicious, 
though not on their face to raise suspicion of terrorism financing. What we 
can tell from examining the cases is that it might have been possible for the 
101 See generally Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?, supra note 1 (explaining how SARs ex-
posed governor Eliot Spitzer's political scandal involving money laundering and prostitu-
tion). 
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reporting institution to have discovered terrorism connections during the 
examination process, or for FinCEN to have done so when receiving the 
SAR. However, because researchers did not have access to this information 
it is impossible to determine at this time. 
The one case indicating a possible set of transactions that might be 
a unique indicator for terrorism financing involved repeat purchases from a 
military equipment store. To determine if this should raise a suspicion of 
terrorism finance, it would be necessary to see if such purchases are, in fact, 
sufficiently unusual to distinguish them in a meaningful way from non-
terrorism related purchases. This could perhaps be done by comparing them 
with other purchases from similar stores. Researchers will attempt to locate 
such information for the final Report. 
SUMMARY TABLE 
DATA, TYPE OF TRANSACTION(S), SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION 
Case Data Available Type of Transaction(s) Suspicious Transac-
# tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
1 Detailed information Multiple significant wire ST: Yes. 
on wire and check transfers among charities ML: Layering, inte-
transactions. with bank accounts m gration. 
various jurisdictions; final PC: No. 
withdrawal of cash trans-
ferred to terrorist organi-
zation. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
2 General description Single significant wire ST: Yes. 
only. transfer from a personal ML: Placement, lay-
bank account in the US to enng. 
a personal bank account PC: Yes. 
in Canada. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
3 No description. Unknown. Unknown. 
4 General description Cash deposits to personal Yes. 
only. bank account followed by ML: Placement, lay-
a series of small denomi- ering, possible inte-
nated checks paid to a gration. 
business umelated to the PC: No. 
payor. No obvious legiti-
mate connection. 
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Case 
# 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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Data Available 
General description 
only. 
Detailed information 
on wire and check 
transactions. 
General description 
only. 
General description 
only. 
General description 
only. 
Type of Transaction(s) 
Large wire transfers from 
personal accounts in one 
jurisdiction to multiple 
accounts in another. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection. 
Wire and check transfers 
from company account 
controlled by one person 
m one jurisdiction to a 
personal account con-
trolled by the same person 
in another jurisdiction. 
Significant cash deposits 
and w1re transfers from 
various personal accom1ts 
to a single person's ac-
count, followed by trans-
fers to a charity in another 
jurisdiction, followed by 
further transfers to multi-
ple accounts in other ju-
risdictions. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
Wire or check transac-
tions from one charity to 
numerous accounts of 
unknown control, receipt 
of a very large amount 
from a foreign account of 
unknown control to a 
charity. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
Significant cross border 
wire transaction from 
company in one jurisdic-
tion with possible owner-
ship/control held by pos-
sible terrorists to numer-
ous accounts m other 
jurisdictions of unknmvn 
control. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering and/or unli-
censedMSB. 
PC: No. 
ST:No. 
PC No. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, possible inte-
gration, and/or unli-
censed MSB. 
PC: No. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Possible place-
ment (depending on 
nature of deposits), 
layering. 
PC: Diversion of 
charitable donations. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Possible place-
ment (depending on 
nature of deposits), 
layering. 
PC: No. 
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Case Data Available 
# 
10 Sale of stolen tele-
phone cards. 
11 General description 
only. 
12 
13 
14 
General description 
only. 
General description 
only. 
Detailed information. 
Type of Transaction(s) 
Unknown. 
Cash deposits, large inter-
national wire transfers 
from personal bank ac-
counts under false name 
to money transfer compa-
nies with unknown ac-
count names/owner or 
controller. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
Large number of cash 
deposits under different 
business names at various 
banks to a single account 
at one business with no 
obvious business connec-
tion, large wire transfers 
from that business to dif-
ferent bank accounts m 
other jurisdictions. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection. 
Numerous deposits made 
to various individual ac-
counts, then transferred to 
single accounts in differ-
ent jurisdiction, then 
checks paid to individuals 
in a third jurisdiction. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection. 
Small amounts sent via 
wire transfers from a bank 
account in one jurisdiction 
to various individual bank 
accounts in another juris-
diction. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
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Suspicious Tnmsac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
ST: Unknown. 
PC: Yes. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, and/or unli-
censedMSB. 
PC: Yes. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, and/or unli-
censed MSB. 
PC: No. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, possible inte-
gration. 
PC: Diversion of 
charitable donations. 
ST:No. 
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Case 
# 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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Data Available 
Some detailed infor-
mation on wire and 
check transactions, 
some actual transac-
tion records. 
General description 
only. 
General description 
only. 
General description 
only. 
Detailed information. 
Type of Trausaction(s) 
Large international wire 
transfers from various 
charitable and personal 
accounts in one jurisdic-
tion to personal accounts 
in another jurisdiction 
(some in the name of the 
same individual) in anoth-
er jurisdiction. No obvi-
ous legitimate connection 
in all cases. 
Small MSB wire transfers 
by a person in one juris-
diction to a person in 
another jurisdiction. 
Large bank transfers from 
accounts in one jurisdic-
tion to multiple accounts 
held by one person at 
multiple banks in another 
jurisdiction. Large num-
bers of transfers from one 
personal bank account in 
that jurisdiction to many 
different recipient ac-
counts in the same juris-
diction. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
Suspicious Tnu:D.sac-
tion(s) [STJ? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Layering, possi-
ble integration. 
PC: Diversion of 
charitable donations. 
ST:No. 
PC: No. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Layering, possi-
ble integration. 
PC: Unclear. 
Direct bank transfers from ST: No. 
a charity in one jurisdic- PC: Diversion of 
tion to two charities m charitable donations. 
another jurisdiction. 
Large transfers from a ST: Yes. 
number of individual banlc ML: Placement, lay-
accounts in one country to 
a number of individual 
bank accounts m other 
countries. No obvious 
legitimate counection. 
ering. 
PC: Yes. 
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Case Data Available 
# 
20 General description 
only. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
No description. 
Some detailed infor-
mation. 
General description 
only. 
Court documents 
provide detailed in-
formation on wire and 
check transactions 
including payment 
records. 
General description 
only. 
Type of Transaction(s) 
Wire transfers from per-
sonal accounts in one 
jurisdiction to the person-
al accounts of the same 
individual in other juris-
dictions. Large wire trans-
fers from one personal 
account in the US to the 
personal account of an 
unconnected individual in 
another jurisdiction. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection? 
Unknown. 
Large wire transfers from 
company account in one 
jurisdiction to account in 
another. Because a sting 
operation, unknown if 
recipient account was 
profiled by bank. 
Size and origin ofMSB 
wire transfers unknown. 
Small deposits to charity 
bank account in one juris-
diction, wire transfers to 
large number of unrelated 
individual bank accounts 
m another jurisdiction, 
then w1re transfers to 
large number of unrelated 
individual bank accounts 
in various additional ju-
risdictions, then cash 
withdrawn. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
Deposits. 
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Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of cdme 
[PC]? 
ST: Possible. 
ML: Large transfers 
to umelated person 
may not fit client 
profile raising suspi-
cion oflayering. 
PC: No. 
ST: Unknown. 
No. 
ST: Unknown. 
PC: Presumed no. 
ST: Unlmown. 
PC: Yes. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Layering, inte-
gration. 
PC: No. 
ST:No. 
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Case Data Available Type of Tnmsaction(s) Suspicious Tnmsac-
# tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
26 General description Cross border payments of ST: Unknown. 
only. unknown type, single 
small cross border wire 
transfer. 
27 General description Small number of small ST:No. 
only. MSB wire transfers from ST:No. 
one jurisdiction to several 
individuals in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
28 General description Fraudulent credit card ST:No. 
only. application, credit card PC: Yes. 
payments. 
29 General description Debit card payments to a ST: Possible. 
only. designated terrorist organ- TF: Repeat purchases 
ization and to high-tech from military equip-
military equipment com- ment store? 
parries; medium sized PC: No. 
cross-border wire transfer 
to an unknown person. 
30 General description Medium-sized cross bor- ST:No. 
only. der wire transfer. PC: No. 
ANNEX: TTERRORISM INDICATORS                                
 
Definitions 
 
Placement: is the first stage of the money laundering process, and is used to 
“introduce the unlawful proceeds into the financial system without attracting the 
attention of financial institutions or law enforcement.”1 This can be accomplished 
by depositing cash into a bank account. The exchange of one currency into 
another, as well as the conversion of smaller notes into larger denominations may 
occur at this stage. Furthermore, illegal funds may be converted into financial 
instruments, such as money orders or checks, and commingled with legitimate 
funds to divert suspicion. Furthermore, placement may be accomplished by the 
cash purchase of a security or a form of an insurance contract.2 
 
Layering: is the second stage of the money laundering process, moving funds 
through the financial system to “create confusion and complicate the paper trail.”3 
The second money laundering stage occurs after the ill-gotten gains have entered 
the financial system, at which point the funds, securities or insurance contracts are 
converted or moved to other institutions, further separating them from their 
criminal source. Such funds could then be used to purchase other securities, 
insurance contracts or other easily transferable investment instruments and then 
sold through yet another institution. The funds could also be transferred by any 
form of negotiable instrument such as check, money order, bearer bond, or the 
funds can be transferred electronically to other accounts in various jurisdictions. 
The launderer may also disguise the transfer as a payment for goods or services or 
transfer the funds to a shell corporation.4  
 
Integration: is the “ultimate goal of the money laundering process.” Following 
the layering stage, “the integration stage is used to create the appearance of 
legality through additional transactions. These transactions further shield the 
criminal from a recorded connection to the funds by providing a plausible 
explanation for the source of the funds.”5   
 
                                                 
1 FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 12 (April 2010), hereinafter BSA/AML MANUAL.  
2 Paul Allan Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM: SECOND EDITION AND SUPPLEMENT ON SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
I-7 (2006), hereinafter Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, available at 
http://www.Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf. 
3 BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 12. 
4 Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at I-8. 
5 BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 12. 
Smurfing: is a strategy commonly employed by money launderers in the 
placement and layering stages, where large amounts of cash are broken into 
smaller, less conspicuous amounts that are below the country’s reporting 
threshold and deposited over time in different offices of a single financial 
institution or in multiple financial institutions.6 
 
Cases7 
 
1. Abdulrahman Alamoudi.  
 
 The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (“HLF”) was a 
non-profit corporation organized in 1989, with its headquarters in Richardson, 
Texas.8 It was originally incorporated under the name Occupied Land Fund, and 
changed its corporate name to Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
in 1991. HLF was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity 
(“SDGT”) in 2001 for funding Hamas. The Success Foundation was a US-
registered charity with bank account in Bank of America. The Happy Hearts Trust 
was an Isle of Man trust with bank accounts at Bank Mercantile in Um-El-Fahem, 
Israel, and Harbisons Bank, UK.  The Humanitarian Relief Association (“HRA”), 
with a bank account at Bank Mercantile,  Humanitarian Appeal International 
(“HAI”), a corporation located in Onex, Switzerland, with a bank account at 
Harbisons Bank.9  
 Alamoudi had signature rights at Success, Happy Hearts, HRA, and HAI. 
Wire transfers and check payments were made among HLF, Success, Happy 
                                                 
6 Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at VI-25. 
7 Case documents are on file with the author. 
8 Terrorist financing often involves the “improper use of charitable or relief funds.” BSA/AML 
MANUAL, supra note 1 at 13. FinCEN has identified the “use of unfamiliar charity/relief 
organization[s] as a link in transactions” and “wire transfer activities to and from multiple relief 
and/or charitable organizations, domestic and foreign” as indicators of terrorism finance and 
money laundering.  John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, 
Tips & Issues, August 2002, pg. 20, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_04.pdf.   As noted in the BSA/AML 
Examination Manual, “[b]ecause NGOs can be used to obtain funds for charitable organizations, 
the flow of funds both into and out of the NGO can be complex, making them susceptible to abuse 
by money launderers and terrorists.  BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 320.  Furthermore, 
FATF recognizes that charities are particularly susceptible to terrorism financiers because: (1) 
“they enjoy the public trust”; (2) they “have access to considerable sources of funds”; (3) “their 
activities are often cash-intensive”; (4) they often “have a global presence”; (5) they are “often in 
or near areas most exposed to terrorist activity”; and (6) they are “subject to significantly lighter 
regulatory requirements than financial institutions or publicly-held corporate entities.”  FATF, 
Terrorist Financing, Feb. 2008, pg 11, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf.  As such, the Special Recommendations require countries 
to implement laws and regulations designed to prevent non-profit organizations from being used 
by terrorist financiers.  Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at IX-12. 
9 Id. 
Hearts, HRA, and HAI finally to Association	 Secours Palestinian, a foundation 
located in Basel, Switzerland and with a bank account there.10 Cash was finally 
distributed to Hamas, also a SDGT.1112 See also Holy Land Foundation and 
Benevolence International Foundation cases below. 
 
Data: Court documents provide detailed information on wire and check 
transactions among these organizations. Actual payment records were not 
available as they were not themselves admitted as evidence.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Multiple wire transfers among charities with bank 
accounts in various jurisdictions, with final withdrawal of cash transferred to 
terrorist organization.13 Ownership, control etc. of each charity is not immediately 
obvious.14   
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, integration.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.   
 
2.  Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali Alishtari (aka Michael Mixon) 
    
 Ali Alishtari (“Alishtari”) was the administrator of a loan investment 
program. Alishtari was under FBI surveillance which used a sting operation. He 
secretly tried to send $152,000 stolen through fraud from the investment program 
to the Middle East to buy equipment such as night vision goggles for a terrorist 
training camp in Afghanistan.1516 As part of this he wire-transferred about 
                                                 
10 Layering. 
11 Integration. 
12 Wire transfers among shell companies can be indicative of money laundering transactions.  As 
noted by FinCEN, “[many] suspicious wire transfer patterns involve shell companies—i.e., 
corporations that engage in no apparent business activity and that only serve as a conduit for funds 
or securities.  Often, the activities also involve foreign transactors located in jurisdictions 
considered non-compliant or problematic.”  John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN, The SAR 
Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, October 2000, pp 11-12 available at  
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_01.pdf.  For a list of risk factors that make 
transactions among shell companies suspicious and indicate money laundering, see BSA/AML 
MANUAL, supra note 1 at F-7.  See also John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR 
Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, August 2004, pg. 3-9, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_07.pdf (discussing shell corporations and 
potential indicators of possible shell corporation and shell bank misuse). 
13 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
14 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
15 Placement. 
16 FinCEN notes that “[t]errorist organizations [may] use alternative and less obvious means to 
acquire and move capital.  Those means may involve committing crimes that, in the past, were not 
immediately associated with terrorist fundraising and financing schemes.”  John J. Byrne & David 
K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, August 2004, pg. 3, available 
$25,000 from his personal bank account in New York to a personal bank account 
in Montreal, Canada, where he believed the money would be transferred to 
Afghanistan.17 Alishtari plead guilty in September, 2009 to material support. 
However, because of the plea agreement, no direct evidence regarding the 
transfers was admitted.  
 
Data: Court documents describe payment forms only in generalities.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Single significant wire transfer from a personal bank 
account in the US to a personal bank account in Canada.18 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Yes.   
    
3.  Amawi, El-Hindi, and Mazloum.   
  
 Beginning in June 2004, Mohammed Zaki Amawi, Marwan El-Hindi and 
Wassim Mazloum allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to kill or maim persons 
outside the United States, including U.S. armed forces personnel in Iraq, and to 
kill then President George Bush. The three defendants allegedly provided material 
support, including money, training, communications equipment, computers and 
                                                                                                                                     
at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_07.pdf.  Suspicious activity reporting has 
uncovered similar investment fraud schemes in the U.S.  See John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, 
FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, October 2000, pg. 16, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_01.pdf; John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles, 
FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, November 2003, pg. 46, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_06.pdf. 
17 Layering. 
18 Moving money by wire transfer is a “primary technique for moving terrorist funds.”  FATF, 
Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment, July 2010, pg 24, available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf.  Indeed, wire transfers are one of the top 
three activities described in U.S. Suspicious Activity Reports filed as a result of a name match 
with a government terror list.  John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN, The SAR Activity 
Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, August 2002, pg. 26, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_04.pdf.  For a list of risk factors that make fund 
transfers suspicious and indicate money laundering, see Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, April 2010, pp. F-2-3, 
F-10.  See also John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips 
& Issues, April 2005, pg. 25, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_08.pdf (reporting the discovery of terrorism 
finance where Defendants engaged in a series of overseas financial transactions, but funneling all 
money through a U.S. branch of a bank headquartered in the Middle East).  Terrorism-related wire 
activity is often to and from Middle Eastern countries.  John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN, 
The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, February 2003, pg. 22, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_05.pdf. 
personnel, including themselves, to unnamed co-conspirators in the Middle East, 
knowing that the materials would be used in waging violent jihad against the U.S. 
military and Coalition forces in Iraq and elsewhere. The object of the conspiracy 
was allegedly to obtain funds from the LITC federal grant program through ESFS, 
a Toledo-based non-profit charitable organization, to divert the grant funds.19 On 
Feb. 19, the Treasury Department ordered U.S. banks to freeze the assets of 
ESFS; other items seized by federal agents during the arrests included bank 
accounts.   
 In September 2008 the defendants were convicted. No documents 
concerning financial transactions were introduced into evidence.  
 
Data: Court documents do not describe payment forms.     
 
Type of Transaction(s): Unknown.  
   
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown. 
 
4.  Yassin Muhiddin Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain.   
 
 In 2005, Yassin Muhiddin Aref (“Aref”) and Mohammed Mosharref 
Hossain (“Hossain”) were indicted for conspiracy to engage in money laundering 
and substantive acts of money laundering and material support. They agreed to 
work with an informant in a scheme to conceal the source of $50,000.20 The 
cooperator told the defendants that the money came from the sale of a surface-to-
air missile to a designated terrorist group called Jaish-e-Mohammed.  
 A cooperating witness (“CW”) proposed a scheme to provide the $50,000 
cash proceeds from the importation of the SAM to Hossain who would, in turn, 
provide monthly checks written to the CW's business, Hay's Distributors, in the 
total amount of $45,000.21 Hossain would keep the remaining $5,000. CW 
provided cash payments totaling $40,000 in the form of five deliveries between 
January 2, 2004 and June 9, 2004.22 Each time, Aref received and counted the 
cash and then gave it to Hossain. Aref provided receipts to the CW for the cash. 
Hossain deposited the amounts to his personal bank account. He then wrote 
checks ten checks made payable to Hay’s Distributors between January 2, 2004 
and August 3, 2004.23 
                                                 
19 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
20 Money Laundering can be “The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property 
is derived from any [drug trafficking] offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such 
offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or 
of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses to evade 
the legal consequences of his actions;” Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at 21. 
21 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
22 Placement; Smurfing. 
23 Layering; Smurfing 
 
Defendants were charged with conspiracy and attempt to commit money 
laundering and to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization. 
The Government alleged that the defendants agreed to work with a cooperator in a 
scheme to conceal the source of $50,000. The cooperator told the defendants that 
the money came from the sale of a surface-to-air missile to a designated terrorist 
group called Jaish-e-Mohammed. The missile was to be fired at a target in New 
York City. In 2007 Hossain was convicted on all twenty-seven counts against 
him. Aref was convicted on ten counts and acquitted on the others. While 
prosecutors have agreed to provide documentation on payments they have yet to 
do so. 
 
Data: Court documents describe transactions only in generalities. Additional 
documents expected.    
 
Type of Transaction(s): Significant number of cash deposits to personal bank 
account followed by a series of small denominated checks paid to a business 
unrelated to the payor. 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, possible integration.    
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.       
 
5.  Mohammad Anvari-Hamedani.   
 
 According to prosecutors Anvari-Hamedani was a hawaladar who engaged 
in a series of transactions involving wire transfers of approximately $4 million in 
funds and equipment to Iran, using his account at Merril Lynch in the United 
States, to intermediary banks Great Britain, Hong Kong, and then to the United 
Arab Emirates then to Iran.2425 He pleaded guilty in 2006 for operating an 
unlicensed money service business.26 Details on payments were not admitted as 
evidence. 
                                                 
24 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
25 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
26 With limited exceptions, many MSBs are subject to the full range of BSA regulatory 
requirements, including the anti-money laundering program rule, suspicious activity and currency 
transaction reporting rules, and various other identification and recordkeeping rules.253 Existing 
FinCEN regulations require certain MSBs to register with FinCEN.254 Finally, many states have 
established supervisory requirements, often including the requirement that an MSB be licensed 
with the state(s) in which it is incorporated or does business. BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 
309. FinCEN notes that “Personal accounts used as “layering” points involving wire transfers sent 
into those accounts from unregistered and/or unlicensed MSBs and then transferred abroad”. 
Indeed, it also mentions “a subject engaged in the suspected operation of an unlicensed MSB 
conducting numerous outgoing wire transmissions out of his personal account”. See John J. Byrne 
     
Data:  Court documents describe payment forms only in generalities.27 
 
Type of Transaction(s): Large wire transfers from personal accounts in one 
jurisdiction to multiple accounts in another.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering and/or unlicensed 
MSB.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.   
 
6.  Khalid Awan 
    
 In May 2004, Khalid Awan (“Awan”) was being held at the Metropolitan 
Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, where he encountered Harjit Singh 
(“Singh”), another inmate who was awaiting sentencing, who became a 
cooperating witness. During their conversations, Awan told Singh that he knew a 
Pakistani terrorist named Paramjit Singh Panjwar leader of the Khalistan 
Commando Force ("KCF"), a Sikh terrorist organization which had conducted 
violent attacks against people and property in India. Awan assisted in transferring 
his own money and assisting others in transferring money to the KCF. Awan 
accomplished this in part by wire transferring/sending checks from the Tee Jay's 
Fashion account in moderate amounts at HSBC bank, controlled by his friend Mr. 
Butt, to an account controlled by Mr. Butt at Habib Bank in Pakistan.28 
Prosecutors provided details of these transactions as well as additional evidence in 
the form of recorded conversations but actual payment records were not available 
as they were not themselves admitted as evidence.   
 
Data:  Court documents providing detailed information on wire and check 
transactions among these organizations. Actual payment records were not 
available as they were not themselves admitted as evidence.   
 
                                                                                                                                     
& David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, November 2003, 
pg. 7&8, available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_06.pdf. 
27 Reports indicating excessive outbound wire activity were common in Suspicious Activity 
Reports filed by the securities and futures industries. Preliminary indicators are that individuals 
who engage in this activity within one year of establishing a brokerage account were more likely 
to send funds outside of the U.S. John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity 
Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, October, 2005, pg. 14 available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_09.pdf. See also id. at 37 (defendants deposited 
drug proceeds into more than 50 bank accounts in the name of front companies, and then 
transferred the funds to various countries). 
28 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
Type of Transaction(s): Wire and check transfers from company account 
controlled by one person in one jurisdiction to a personal account controlled by 
the same person in another jurisdiction.  Could be distribution of profits. 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No. 
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.   
 
 
 
7.  Al-Barakat, Abdirahman Isse and Abdillah Abdi.  
 
 Abdirahman Isse (“Isse”) and Abdillah Abdi (“Abdi”) received cash funds 
from customers; they deposited the funds in multiple accounts of businesses 
controlled by them at various branches of banks in Northern Virginia.  To avoid 
the $10,000 threshold for reporting transactions, they always deposited the 
amounts with the banks in sums of less than $10,000, usually between $9,000 and 
$9,990, and on some days, they made several such deposits.2930 Because the 
deposits were in cash amounts less than $10,000, they did not prompt the banks to 
file currency transaction reports.  Isse and Abdi then wired the funds from the 
bank accounts to the Al-Barakat headquarters in the United Arab Emirates, a 
registered charity.3132 Following this, transfers were made from the account to 
personal and other bank accounts in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan.33 As 
compensation for each transmission of funds for a customer, the defendants 
generally retained 1% of the deposit and remitted another 3% to Al-Barakat, of 
which Al-Barakat kept two-thirds (2% of the total deposit) and remitted the 
remaining one-third (1% of the total deposit) to the agent in the receiving 
country.34  Mohammad Hussein was involved in similar activity in Al-Barakat’s 
Boston operations.  Isse and Abdi pled guilty to structuring in 2003.  No detailed 
transaction records were offered as evidence.  
 
Data: Court documents provide only general description.   Proceeds of Crime?  
No.    
 
Type of Transaction(s): Significant cash deposits and wire transfers from various 
personal accounts to a single person’s account, followed by transfers to a charity 
                                                 
29 Placement. 
30 Smurfing. 
31 Layering; see supra text accompanying note 17. 
32 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
33 Layering. 
34 Possible integration. 
in another jurisdiction, followed by further transfers to multiple accounts in other 
jurisdictions.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, possible integration, 
and/or an MSB.   
 
 
 
 
8.  Benevolence International Foundation, Enaam Arnaout   
 
 The Benevolence International Foundation (“BIF”) claimed to be a 
nonprofit, religious, humanitarian, charitable organization funded by donations 
from individuals, businesses, and other Islamic organizations and dedicated to 
assisting individuals afflicted by war, natural disaster, and extreme poverty.3536 
Also according to BIF, since 1992, it had administered essential humanitarian aid 
to the poor in needy areas of the world, by distributing food, clothing, and 
medical services in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, China, and Pakistan, and 
by operating hospitals, medical and dental clinics, and orphanages in places such 
as Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Daghestan, and Ingushetia, using payments to accounts 
of foreign branch offices.  BIF, was an Illinois corporation with offices in Illinois 
and New Jersey and approximately ten offices overseas. Allegedly Enaam 
Arnaout (“Arnaout”), who in 1993 assumed formal management of BIF, had 
secretly (i.e. concealed from many donors to BIF) used a portion of the money 
raised by BIF to support Mujahideen, including al-Qaeda, engaged in armed 
confrontations and violence overseas, such as in Chechnya and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Arnaout allegedly transferred funds from BIF’s checking accounts 
in Illinois to various bank accounts in New Jersey and outside the United States, 
although the owner/controller of those bank accounts was not revealed. Also, an 
unknown person’s account at the Union Bank of Switzerland wire transferred 
$1,414,406  to BIF’s checking account in the United States. Those funds were 
commingled in BIF’s checking account with donations that BIF received from 
other sources and disbursed in large part to the BIF offices overseas. 
 On December 14, 2001 U.S. Treasury blocked all BIF assets. FBI 
searched the Chicago offices of BIF and Arnaout’s home, seizing from both 
places items such as financial records, office equipment, and personal property. 
Charges included conspiracy to engage in financial transactions involving 
proceeds of unlawful activities, namely mail fraud and wire fraud, with the intent 
to promote those crimes, as well as to provide material support to organizations 
                                                 
35 Because NGOs can be used to obtain funds for charitable organizations, the flow of funds both 
into and out of the NGO can be complex, making them susceptible to abuse by money launderers 
and terrorists. BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 320. 
36 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
involved in violent activities; and to transfer funds from within the United States 
to outside the United States with intent to give material support to organizations 
engaged in violent activities.3738 In 2003 Enaam Arnaout pled guilty to 
racketeering only. Evidence concerning transactions was not introduced. 
 
Data: Court documents provide only general description of payment transactions.   
Proceeds of Crime?    
 
Type of Transaction(s): Wire or check transactions from one charity to numerous 
accounts of unknown control, receipt of a very large amount from a foreign 
account of unknown control to a charity.39 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Possible placement, layering.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Diversion of charitable donations.   
 
 
 
9.  BMI/Mostan, Soliman Bihieri,  Mousa Mohammad Abu Marzook, Ghaleb 
Himmat and Youssef Nada 
 
 In 1985, BMI was incorporated in New Jersey. The articles of 
incorporation of BMI listed Soliman S. Biheiri (“Biheiri”), an Egyptian convicted 
of immigration violations, as an incorporator and as BMI’s President.  In 1988, 
Mostan International Corporation (“Mostan”) was incorporated in New Jersey.  
Bihieri was an incorporator and Vice President and was Mostan’s registered agent 
and Director.  Mousa Mohammad Abu Marzook (“Marzook”), the self-
proclaimed political leader of Hamas and an SDGT in Novermber 1, 2001, was its 
president.  Mostan was established to generate funds for Marzook/Hamas. 
Marzook was its sole shareholder. 
 Mostan had an account at the Bank of New York. The bank records for 
Mostan showed large wire transfers to overseas accounts.40 Biheiri’s computer 
was searched and found to have contact information for Ghaleb Himmat and 
Youssef Nada. 
 BMI reported more than $25,000,000 in projected revenues and leases as 
early as 1992 in a business that solicited real-estate investments and offered 
leasing services for Muslims in what was alleged to be a scheme based in Virginia 
and Maryland to raise cash for terrorists.41  
                                                 
37 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
38 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
39 Id. 
40 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
41 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
BMI's investors included Abu Marzook, who was an investor in an Oxon Hill 
real-estate development known as Barnaby Knolls which was financed through a 
BMI subsidiary, BMI Real Estate Development Inc., and involved the 
construction of 57 homes, beginning in January 1991; Yasin Qadi (“Qadi”), a 
Saudi multimillionaire involved in banking, chemicals, diamonds and real estate, 
who was designated by the Treasury Department in 2002 as a terrorist and is 
suspected of diverting millions of dollars to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. 
Authorities alleged that Qadi led the Saudi-based Muwafaq (Blessed Relief) 
Foundation, which the U.S. Treasury Department said was used as a front for al-
Qaeda to launder millions of dollars to the terrorist organization. Yousef Nada, an 
Egyptian national and resident of Switzerland, who was designated a terrorist 
financier by the U.S. and U.N. in November 2001. U.S. law-enforcement 
authorities suspected that Nada provided significant funding to al-Qaeda; Nada is 
a founder of Al-Taqwa Bank, which was alleged to be at the center of a financial 
network that helped fund global terrorism. The U.S. Treasury Department 
designated the bank an SDGT shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks.  
 Bihieri was found guilty in 2004 of making false statements. Marzook was 
indicted for various terrorism related crimes and money laundering in absentia in 
2003. 
 In 2006 Nada sued the Swiss government because of financial losses 
incurred resulting from the three-and-a-half year investigation. “It was all wrong,” 
Nada, the 75-year-old founder and former managing director of Nada 
Management, formerly known as al-Taqwa, said at his home in Italy near the 
Swiss border. "Switzerland was mistaken and misled." In 2005 the Swiss 
authorities dropped their investigation. But Switzerland was forced to drop the 
case against top officials of the company on July 1, 2005 because they said 
authorities in the Bahamas had failed to provide essential bank records by a court 
deadline.  
 
Data: Court documents provide only general information on payment transactions, 
including the “significant wire transfers overseas” from BMI. Details on 
transactions are expected from prosecutors.    
 
Type of Transaction(s): Significant cross border wire transaction from company 
in one jurisdiction with possible ownership/control held by possible terrorists to 
numerous accounts in other jurisdictions of unknown control.4243 
                                                 
42 Cross-border transfers need to be accompanied by the name, account number (or unique 
reference number where there is no account e.g. one-off transactions), and address. An identity 
number or customer identification number or date and place of birth can be substituted for the 
address if there are fears about revealing the address of a customer. Providing this information on 
the wire transfer will enable information about the sender to be obtained much more quickly and 
easily if there is an international money laundering or terrorist financing investigation than if it has 
to be the subject of lengthy inquiries. Paul A. Schott. The World Bank. Reference Guide to Anti-
   
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Possible placement (depending on nature 
of deposits), layering.  Possible terrorism financing due the terrorist-related 
ownership/control of payor.44     
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
 
 
 
10.  The Detroit Sleeper Cell Case, Karim Koubriti, Ahmed Hannan, Farouk 
Ali-Hammoud and Abdel-Ilah Elmardoudi  
 
 This is a troublesome case, with allegations of material support and fraud 
followed by allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Karim Koubriti (“Koubriti”) 
was found guilty of providing material support to a terrorist group and Ahmed 
Hannan (“Hannan”) had been found guilty of identification forgery, but these 
convictions were overturned in 2004 when the lead prosecutor and star witness 
were accused of mishandling evidence and providing false testimony, 
respectively. Koubriti and Hannqn were found guilty of mail fraud, insurance 
fraud and material support of terrorism in connection with his ‘economic jihad’ 
scheme to defraud an insurance firm. 
 Exactly how these funds were used to support terrorism, and through what 
financing means, is not clear from available court documents. Abdel-Ilah 
Elmardoudi was convicted for operating a phone card “shoulder surfing” scheme 
in which he stole hundreds of telephone calling-card numbers from unsuspecting 
travelers at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport and then “supplied 
them to overseas callers who used them” to make a total of $745,000 in 
international calls from Egypt, Kuwait, East Africa, the Philippines, the Middle 
East, and the Balkans.  
 The lead prosecutor was dismissed from this case for prosecutorial 
misconduct and later prosecuted. After speaking with his attorney and attempting 
to negotiate a discussion he decided not to discuss the case. So far, we have been 
unable to locate anyone at Department of Justice who is willing to discuss the 
case. 
 
Data: Court documents provide no description.      
 
Type of Transaction(s):  Unknown. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing, 2006, at 175 available at 
http://www.Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf.  
43 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
44 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Yes.     
 
11.  Hossein Esfahani.   
 
 According to allegations Hossein Esfahani (“Esfahani”) was a hawaladar 
who transmitted funds to and from Iran by means of wire transfers through 
intermediary money exchanges in Dubai via Harris Bank to Dubai from October 
31, 2001 through February 14, 2005, in breach of financial sanctions against 
Iran.45 Using the false name “Ahmad Khalij,” Esfahani set up various shell bank 
accounts in the U.S.46 Deposits ranged from just $200 to $150,000, much of 
which was proceeds of drug crime.47 The majority of the nearly $4,000,000 sent 
to Iran was wired to three Dubai money transfer companies, and, from there to 
Shiraz, Iran.48 In the remaining cases he “used hawala to send cash to Iran.” 
While terrorism financing is not directly alleged it seems clear that Esfahani was 
trying to evade detection, so similar issues arise.  
 In 2006 Esfahani pled guilty to operating an unlicensed MSB and to 
breaching sanctions against Iran. We have contacted prosecutors to see what if 
any evidence on transactions was admitted to trial but they have not responded to 
repeated requests. 
 
Data: Court documents provide only general descriptions of payment types. 
Because Esfahani pled guilty it may be that no details were admitted into 
evidence.      
 
Type of Transaction(s): Cash deposits, large international wire transfers from 
personal bank accounts under false name to money transfer companies with 
unknown account names/owner or controller. 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed 
MSB.    
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Yes.     
 
12.  Abad Elfgeeh.   
 
 Abad Elfgeeh (“Elfgeeh”) was a hawaladar who maintained an account for 
Carnival French Ice Cream (“Carnival”) at J.P. Morgan Chase, as well 12 feeder 
                                                 
45 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
46 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
47 Placement; Possible smurfing; See supra text accompanying note 19. 
48 Layering. 
accounts at Chase and other banks in the names of various physical persons and 
businesses.49 Large totals of money was deposited into the Carnival account in 
small amounts as transfers from the feeder accounts and large sums of money was 
wired out of the Carnival account to accounts in 25 foreign countries, although the 
names of the receiving accounts are not noted.50 For example, in a one-month 
period during the fall of 2000, more than $245,000 was deposited into the 
Carnival account and more than $268,000 was wired out. Between 1996 and 
2003, the total amount deposited into the Carnival account was $22,190,642.21, 
and the total amount withdrawn was $ 21,995,556.54. Another Chase bank 
account in the name of the Prospect Deli that was opened by Aref and listed the 
home address and telephone number of Elfgeeh, which was the same account-
opening information used for another feeder account at Astoria Federal Bank. The 
Prospect Deli was a business a few blocks away from the Carnival French Ice 
Cream shop; the Prospect Deli was in operation only from 1996 to 1998, but 
activity in the Prospect Deli bank account continued until 2002.51 For example, 
bank records showed that in 2001 approximately $850,000 was deposited into the 
Prospect Deli account and about $ 823,000 was transferred out to the Carnival 
account. 
 Evidence showed Elfgeeh’s money transfers were tied to Sheikh 
Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad, who was sentenced to 75 years in a U.S. 
prison and fined $1,250,000 for conspiring to support and fund al-Qaeda and 
Hamas. Elfgeeh was convicted in 2006 of running an unlicensed MSB. Repeated 
requests for assistance from prosecutors to help identify if any payments records 
were admitted as evidence have been unsuccessful. 
 
Data: Court documents provide only general descriptions of payment types. 
Because Esfahani pled guilty it may be that no details were admitted into 
evidence.      
 
Type of Transaction(s): Large number of cash deposits under different business 
names at various banks to a single account at one business with no obvious 
business connection, large wire transfers from that business to different bank 
accounts in other jurisdictions. 
    
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed 
MSB.    
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.      
 
                                                 
49 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
50 Placement; Layering; Smurfing; See supra text accompanying note 17. 
51 Shell company, see supra text accompanying note 11. 
13.  Help the Needy, Rafil Dhafir, Maher Zagha, Ayman Jarwan, and 
Osameh Al-Wahaidy  
 
 Rafil Dhafir (“Dhafir”), Maher Zagha (“Zagha”), Ayman Jarwan 
(“Jarwan”), and Osameh Al-Wahaidy (“Al-Wahaidy”) and the two unregistered 
charities, Help the Needy and Help the Needy Endowment, Inc., allegedly 
solicited contributions from people in the United States, deposited these funds in 
accounts in their own names at Oneida Savings Bank and Key Bank in New York 
in accounts opened and controlled by Dhafir, Jarwan, and Al-Wahaidy.52 
Payments were then made to accounts in the name of Zagha held at Fleet Bank, 
then paid to another account in Zagha’s name at the Jordan Islamic Bank in 
Amman.53 One or more banks filed a suspicious activity report although the 
details of the report were not identified. From there, checks as large as $ 100,000 
were paid to individuals Iraq in breach of sanctions.54 After Zagha’s Key Bank 
account was closed, transfers were made directly from HTN’s accounts to 
Zagha’s account in Jordan.55 Over $2.7 million was moved through accounts at 
the Jordan Islamic Bank.   
 
Dhafir was convicted in 2005 of various charges. The others pled guilty in 2003. 
Researchers have contacted prosecutors to see if documents regarding payments 
were admitted as evidence but they have yet to respond.  
 
Data: Court documents provide only general descriptions of payment types.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Numerous deposits made to various individual accounts, 
then transferred to single accounts in different jurisdiction, then checks paid to 
individuals in a third jurisdiction.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, possible integration.     
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Diversion of charitable contributions.     
 
14.  Rahmat Abd Hir, Zulkifli Abd Hir Zulkifli   
 
 Rahmat Abd Hir’s (“Abd Hir”) brother is Zulkifli Abd Hir Zulkifli 
(“Zulkifli”), an acknowledged member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and 
an alleged high-ranking member of Jemaah Islamiyah in the Philippines. Abd Hir 
consistently responded to Zulkifli's requests for money and supplies by wiring 
                                                 
52 Placement; Charities, see supra text accompanying note 7. 
53 Layering. 
54 Possible integration. 
55 Layering. 
over $10,000 to his brother using various bank accounts in the Philippines. 
Prosecutors provided detailed information on the wire transfers. 
 
Data: Detailed information on wire transfers.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Small amounts sent via wire transfers from a bank 
account in one jurisdiction to various individual bank accounts in another 
jurisdiction.56   
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No. Recipient was a suspected terrorist making 
the case obvious.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
 
15.  Holy Land Foundation, KindHearts, Khaled Smaili, Abu Marzook 
 
 See also discussion above at Alamoudi regarding HLF. The Global Relief 
Foundation (“GRF”), a U.S. charity, was affiliated with HLF and also designated 
an SGTD.57 After these designations a former GRF official Khaled Smaili 
established KindHearts, a U.S. charity, in January 2002 to continue the missions 
of both HLF and GRF without a designation.58     
 
Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook (“Marzook”), a senior member of Hamas since 
1997, served as the Deputy Chairman of Hamas Political Bureau.  Marzook 
provided substantial funds to the HLF in the early 1990s.  Between 1992 and1993 
Marzook wire transferred from various accounts of the charities and some 
personal accounts nearly $1,000,000 to Salah’s personal bank accounts at LaSalle 
Bank of Chicago.5960  After Salah arrived in Israel he arranged to have 
approximately $230,000 from his personal bank accounts in Chicago transferred 
to his personal bank accounts in an Israeli bank for distribution to Hamas 
members. He was then taken into custody there. In April 1993, when Salah 
remained in custody in Israel, his wife withdrew approximately $536,000 from 
their joint personal LaSalle Bank account and deposited the amount into another 
account at Standard Bank and Trust for personal use in paying off a loan. 
 In 2007 there was a mistrial, but in 2008 HLF and five of its leaders on 
charges of providing material support to Hamas. 
 
                                                 
56 Possible smurfing, if the amounts were small to avoid detection. 
57 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
58 Id. 
59 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
60 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
Data: Court documents provide detailed information on wire and check 
transactions among these organizations and persons. Many actual payment 
records (check and wire transactions) are also available.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Large international wire transfers from various charitable 
and personal accounts in one jurisdiction to personal accounts in another 
jurisdiction (some in the name of the same individual) in another jurisdiction.6162     
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, possible integration.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Diversion of charitable donations.     
 
16.  Richard David Hupper.   
 
 On several occasions during an almost two year period of time, Richard 
David Hupper (“Hupper”) provided money to Hassam Jamjoun (“Jamjoun”), a 
Hamas figure, in Israel. This money was transferred by cash in person by Hupper 
and also by way of a Western Union cash wire transfer to Jamjoun in Israel.6364 
Jamjoun was to transfer these funds to Hamas for a variety of things, including 
assisting the families of Israeli-imprisoned Hamas members. In May of 2008 
Hupper pled guilty to one count of providing material support to Hamas. Because 
of the guilty plea no evidence on the transfers was submitted. However, 
researchers contacted Hupper’s attorney in the hope of persuading Hupper to 
provide the information himself. While he has so far not agreed to cooperate we 
hope that he will eventually change his mind. 
 
 Data: Court documents provide no information on the transactions. It is hoped 
that Hupper may provide these documents voluntarily. 
 
Type of Transaction(s): Small MSB wire transfers by a person in one jurisdiction 
to a person in another jurisdiction.   
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No. Recipient of Western Union transfer was a 
known Hamas figure making the case obvious.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.        
 
 
 
                                                 
61 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
62 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
63 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
64 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
17.  Islamic Assembly of North America, Omar Al Hussayen.   
 
 According to the indictment, between November 16, 1999 and February 
26, 2003, Omar Al Hussayen (“Al Hussayen”) was an employee, official, and 
registered agent of the Islamic Assembly of North America (“IANA”). IANA was 
a U.S. registered non-profit charitable organization with offices in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan.65 As such, he engaged in significant decision-making and business 
transactions related to the IANA’s business, particularly with respect to the 
creation, maintenance and content of websites and other internet media. He also 
set up a number of web sites for various jihadi organizations, including Hamas.  
 Al Hussayen came to the United States from Saudi Arabia to study at the 
University of Idaho.  While there he received a stipend for living expenses from 
Saudi Arabia. During that same time he maintained at least six United States bank 
accounts in Indiana, Texas, Idaho and Michigan.  From at least January 23, 1997, 
until February 26, 2003, he received into and disbursed out of these accounts 
around $300,000 dollars in excess of the stipend he received during the same 
period.66 Beginning November 16, 1999 he disbursed funds to and on behalf of 
IANA and its officers, including its president, to pay various operating expenses, 
including employee salaries and foreign and domestic IANA-related travel 
expenses for himself and others. He also disbursed money directly to the president 
of the IANA via wire transfers and personal checks and maintained a checking 
account in Michigan in his name alone, but with the president’s home address. 
About $100,000 of the money allegedly came in two installments from the 
student's uncle, Saleh Abdel Rahman Al-Hussayen.   
 According to the Justice Department in the spring of 2002, Al-Hussayen 
became a target of a Foreign FISA surveillance based on suspicious activity 
reports, which were based on the amount and source of funds received from 
overseas sources and of donations he made to IANA. Al Hussayen was eventually 
acquitted of all material support charges, although he was deported for breaching 
his immigration status. We have made repeated requests of the prosecutors to 
provide us the evidence, or reference to the evidence, but so far have not 
succeeded.     
 
Data: Court documents available provide no detailed information on the 
transactions.    
 
Type of Transaction(s): Large bank transfers from accounts in one jurisdiction to 
multiple accounts held by one person at multiple banks in another jurisdiction.67 
                                                 
65 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
66 See supra text accompanying note 26. 
67 Layering. 
Large numbers of transfers from one personal bank account in that jurisdiction to 
many different recipient accounts in the same jurisdiction.68      
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, possible integration.    
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Unclear.     
 
18.  Islamic American Relief Agency, Mubarak Hamed, Ali Mohamed 
Bagegni, Abdel Azim El-Siddig, Ahmad Sultan Mustafa and Khalid Al- 
Sudanee 
 
 In 1985, a Sudanese immigrant founded the Islamic African Relief 
Agency. It engaged in humanitarian activities around the world, often in 
partnership with similar organizations. In 2000, Islamic African Relief Agency 
changed its name to the Islamic American Relief Agency (“IARA”).  Meanwhile, 
the entity in Sudan calling itself the Islamic African Relief Agency continued to 
exist under that name.  On October 13, 2004 the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset 
Control (“OFAC”) designated the Islamic African Relief Agency an SDGT. 
Although IARA was not independently designated, OFAC considered it to be the 
United States branch of the Sudanese organization, the decision was 
unsuccessfully challenged. In 2007 IARA and its employees: Mubarak Hamed, 
the organization’s executive director; Ali Mohamed Bagegni; Abdel Azim El-
Siddig; Ahmad Sultan Mustafa and Khalid Al-Sudanee were charged with 
transferring funds from IARA’s bank accounts in the Western District of 
Missouri, to ISRA’s bank accounts in Amman, Jordan. There were a total of 18 
transactions ranging from $4,000 to $50,000 made in this manner.69 In 2008, they 
were charged with transferring $130,000 in 8 transactions, ranging from $7,000 to 
$28,000, from March 2003 to August 2004 to the Islamic Relief Agency 
(“ISRA”) bank accounts in Peshawar, Pakistan, purportedly for an orphanage 
housed in buildings owned and controlled by Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.70 In the latter indictment Mark Siljander 
(“Siljander”), a former U.S. Congressman from Michigan (1981-87) and 
owner/director of Global Strategies, Inc., was charged with with money 
laundering, conspiracy and obstruction of justice in the case. To compensate 
Siljander for his lobbying services to get IARA de-designated, IARA transferred 
roughly $50,000 in funds to accounts that were controlled by Siljander at the 
National Heritage Foundation and the International Foundation.   
 We discussed the cased with prosecutors, but a court protective order 
prohibits them from providing any substantive information. 
 
                                                 
68 Layering; possible integration. 
69 Possible smurfing. 
70 Possible smurfing; see supra text accompanying note 7. 
Data:  Court documents available provide no detailed information on the 
transactions.     
 
Type of Transaction(s): Direct bank transfers from a charity in one jurisdiction to 
two charities in another jurisdiction.71       
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Diversion of charitable donations.     
 
19.  Monzer Al Kassar, a/k/a Abu Munawar, a/k/a El Taous, Tareq Mousa Al 
Ghazi and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy.    
 
 Monzer Al Kassar (“Al-Kassar”) became an arms dealer in the early 1970s 
when the government of Yemen asked him to buy rifles and pistols from Poland 
for them (it is alleged that those arms were then sent to various terror groups).72  
In the 1970s he was arrested in both Denmark and the UK for selling hashish.73 In 
1984 he was expelled from the UK for drug and arms trafficking; he then moved 
to Spain.74  In 1987 investigations into the Iran-Contra scandal found that he had 
been involved in selling arms to the Contras. In 1992 he made arms sales valued 
in the millions of dollars to Croatia, Bosnia and Somalia, violating United Nations 
arms embargoes to all three countries.  Up to 2002 he collaborated with Polish 
Military Information Services in illegal arms trading.  2006, Iraq called him one 
of the main sources of financial and logistics support for the Iraqi insurgency.  In 
2007 he was approached by DEA undercover agents posing as operatives of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) wishing to use drug 
proceeds to purchase weapons.75  Al-Kassar provided them with bank accounts of 
individuals in Spain and Lebanon, which were ultimately were used to receive 
more than $400,000 in payments through bank transfers from bank accounts of 
other individuals.76 
 On November 20, 2008, he was convicted of money laundering and 
conspiring to sell arms to suppliers for FARC.  Prosecutors recently have 
provided researchers with detailed bank records on these transactions. 
 
Data: Court documents provide detailed information on the transactions.     
 
                                                 
71 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
72 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
76 Placement and layering. 
Type of Transaction(s): Large transfers from a number of individual bank 
accounts in one country to a number of individual bank accounts in other 
countries.         
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Yes.     
 
20.  Hemant Lakhani.   
 
 Hemant Lakhani (“Lakhani”) claimed to be able to buy a Stinger missile 
to be used to shoot down an American plane.  An FBI informant named Rehman 
gave purchase money to Lakhani, told him how to send it along so that it would 
look “clean” once it got to London. There were two such transfers: Rehman was 
to give the money to Yehuda Abraham (“Abraham”), a jeweler in Manhattan who 
also owned a money transfer business.77 Lakhani told Rehman that he would 
recognize Abraham upon the presentation of a bill with a specific serial number. 
Abraham then wire transferred the money from his personal account in the U.S. to 
his personal bank accounts in Hong Kong and Switzerland. Lakhani then engaged 
in an effort to purchase a stinger from Ukraine; a U.S./Russian sting operation 
was put into motion to sell Lakhani a fake missile. At Lakhani’s request Matheena 
Raja, an Indian national and businessman, made wire transfers of a total of 
$86,000 in two transactions from his personal account in the U.S. to Lakhani’s 
personal account in London to purchase the missile.78   
 Researchers discussed the case with one of the prosecutors who could not 
recall any financial records being introduced as evidence.   
 
Data: Court documents provide no detailed information. 
   
Type of Transaction(s): Wire transfers from personal accounts in one jurisdiction 
to the personal accounts of the same individual in other jurisdictions. Large wire 
transfers from one personal account in the U.S. to the personal account of an 
unconnected individual in another jurisdiction.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)?  Type: Possible. Large transfers to unrelated person 
may not fit client profile.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
 
 
                                                 
77 See supra text accompanying note 25. 
78 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
21.  LTTE Procurement Plot, Murugesu Vinayagamoorthy, Nachimuthu 
Socrates, Thirukumaran Sinnathamby, Thirukumaran Sivasubramaniam, 
Vijayshanthar Patpanathan, Suresh Sriskandarajah, Ramanan 
Mylvaganam.   
 
 On August 19, 2006 defendants were arrested on Long Island after three 
of them engaged in negotiations with an undercover FBI agent to purchase and 
export anti-aircraft missiles and launchers and other military equipment for the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”). The defendants were allegedly 
acting at the direction of senior LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka, including Pottu 
Amman, the LTTE’s chief of intelligence and procurement and the right-hand 
man to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan. The defendants discussed using bank 
accounts in Switzerland, St. Croix, or other offshore locations to finance the 
purchase. The parties also discussed a total price of between $900,000 and 
$937,500 for the equipment and the training. The complaints also allege that the 
defendants’ conspiracy to provide material support to LTTE included fund raising 
in the United States and Canada, relying on “front” charitable organizations 
including the Tamil Relief Organization and the World Tamil Coordinating 
Committee to give the fund raising the appearance of legitimacy. These 
organizations were also used to send goods and material to LTTE in Sri Lanka.  
 The defendants all pled guilty in 2009. Researchers spoke to the 
prosecutors who said that because the defendants had pled guilty no transaction 
records had been entered into evidence and therefore they remained confidential.  
 
Data: Court documents provide no detailed information. 
   
Type of Transaction(s): Unknown 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.  
 
   
22.  LTTE Procurement Plot, Haji Subandi Thirunavukarasu Varatharasa, 
Haniffa Osman and Erick Wotulo.   
 
 From April to September 29, 2006, Haji Subandi Thirunavukarasu 
Varatharasa (“Varatharasa”), Haniffa Osman and Erick Wotulo, a retired 
Indonesian General, were involved in a plot to export military weapons to the 
LTTE. The case involved a sting operation. Central to the plan were two wire 
transfers, one of $250,000 and one of $452,000 from a company controlled by 
LTTE supporters with an account at the Eon Bank Berhad in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia to an account maintained by the undercover agents in Maryland, 
supposedly to buy missiles. Varatharasa also purchased food and provisions for 
his trip from Guam to deliver the weaponry to the LTTE. 
 All eventually pled guilty. Because of the guilty pleas no evidence was 
submitted on the banking transactions. However, prosecutors provided some 
detailed information on those transactions, which appeared to be simple wire 
transactions from one business to another.  
 
Data:  Court documents provide some detailed information on the transactions. 
   
Type of Transaction(s): Large wire transfers from company account in one 
jurisdiction to account in another. Because a sting operation, unknown if recipient 
account was profiled by bank.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Presumed No.     
 
23.  Mahmoud Maawad.   
 
 Mahmoud Maawad (“Maawad”), an Egyptian, entered the U.S. in 1999 
under a tourist visa and remained after the expiration of his visa. In September, 
2005, Sporty's, Inc, a company that sells pilot training materials, reported that 
they had been defrauded by Maawad. Maawad had placed internet orders for 
numerous books, DVD's, and pilot training software. Maawad had used an ATM 
debit card to pay for the orders, but there were no funds in the account. He had 
also been using a false social security number to work and attend college. When 
FBI agents raided Maawad's campus apartment and found documents of Western 
Union transfers to and from Maawad.  
 Because Maawad pled guilty no details of the Western Union transfers 
were entered into evidence and none is available.  
 
Data: Court documents provide only general description. 
   
Type of Transaction(s): Size and origin of MSB wire transfers unknown.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Yes.     
 
 
 
24.  MEK Case, Roya Rahmani, Hossein Afshari, Mohammad Omidvar, 
Hassan Rezaie, Navid Taj, Najaf Eshkoftegi, Mustafa Ahmady,  and Alireza 
Mohamad Moradi. 
  
 Each was charged in Los Angeles with soliciting charitable contributions 
at the Los Angeles International Airport for the “Committee for Human Rights” 
(“CHR”).79 This money was deposited in a CHR account in at a Bank of America 
branch in Los Angeles.80  From there amounts were wired to various individuals 
with bank accounts at a Turkish bank.81  From there, money was wired to the 
accounts of other individuals in Turkey, then wired to the bank accounts of other 
individuals in Belgium, France, the UAE, and Jordan, which was then diverted to 
the People's Mujahedin of Iran (“MEK”).82 This was done after participating in a 
conference call with an MEK leader, in which they learned that the State 
Department had designated the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization. The MEK 
leader told them to continue to provide material support despite the designation. 
The money sent to the MEK through these various transactions amounted to at 
least several hundred thousand dollars. 
 Prosecutors provided us with details of all transactions involving the US, 
Belgium, and France, numbering in the tens of thousands, as well as all records of 
Rahmani’s personal bank account at Washington Mutual Bank, all of which had 
been admitted into evidence. They also provided us with transcripts of 
conversations relating to such payments.     
 
Data: Court documents provide detailed information on wire and check 
transactions including payment records. 
 
Type of Transaction(s): Small deposits to charity bank account in one jurisdiction, 
wire transfers to large number of unrelated individual bank accounts in another 
jurisdiction, then wire transfers to large number of unrelated individual bank 
accounts in various additional jurisdictions, then cash withdrawn.    
   
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, possible integration.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Diversion of charitable donations.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
80 Placement. 
81 Layering. 
82 Layering and possible integration. 
25.  Uzair Paracha.   
 
 Uzair Paracha (“Paracha”) was accused of conducting financial 
transactions involving that al-Qaeda associate's bank account and of planning to 
accepting up to $200,000 of al-Qaeda funds to be held as an investment in a 
business where Paracha was employed until the funds were needed by al-Qaeda. 
In 2003, an al-Qaeda associate (“AQA”) told Paracha to deposit money into his 
bank account, to use his credit cards, and to close his post office box in Maryland. 
He told Paracha that the reason for these tasks was to make it appear that the 
AQA was still in the United States. The post office box that Paracha was to close 
was held jointly by the AQA and a woman. He said that the woman was a "good 
sister" who was helping them out. Paracha was to impersonate the AQA and close 
the post office box, using the story that he and this woman, with whom the AQA 
had rented the box, were no longer seeing each other. Paracha had possession of 
the AQA’s Maryland driver's license, Social Security card, school identification, 
credit cards, as well as a key to the post office box. 
 While Paracha was found guilty of material support this did not include 
receipt of the $200,000, which was planned only. As a result there was no 
evidence submitted concerning actual financial transactions other than the use of 
another’s credit card in the U.S. to give the impression that that person was 
physically present in the U.S. when in fact he was in Pakistan.     
 
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Deposits. 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
 
26.  Christopher Paul    
 
 Christopher Paul (“Paul”), a 44-year-old Muslim convert and native of 
Columbus, Ohio, allegedly agreed to involvement in a conspiracy to attack 
European resorts where U.S. citizens are known to vacation and U.S. properties, 
such as embassies and military installations. In the early 1990s, Paul traveled to 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. At an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, he 
received initial training in, among other things, the use of assault rifles, rocket-
propelled grenades, and small unit tactics. After successfully completing this 
training, he joined al-Qaeda and stayed at the Beit ur Salam guesthouse. After 
fighting in Afghanistan, Paul returned to Ohio, where he began instructing 
individuals in martial arts at a mosque in Columbus. He also began recruiting 
local individuals with extremist intentions in order to establish a jihadist group in 
Ohio. Over time and through his association with al-Qaeda, Paul became 
dedicated to committing jihad and furthering the objectives of al-Qaeda and other 
radical Islamic fundamentalists. 
 From 1993 through 1995, Paul, using various passports and names, 
traveled to the Balkans and fought in conflict zones such as Bosnia, establishing 
further contact with radical Islamic fundamentalists, and creating a master list of 
al-Qaeda leaders and other Islamic radicals worldwide. Paul returned to 
Columbus after fighting in the Balkans, and, in 1997, received a fax from two al-
Qaeda co-conspirators in Europe asking, on behalf of “the brothers,” for Paul to 
find them a “true group and place to make jihad.” While in Columbus, Paul 
conducted training operations in Burr Oak State Park in Ohio with several 
members of his local group, replicating terrorist training he had received in 
Afghanistan and Bosnia.  
 On April 16, 1999, Paul traveled to meet with members of an Islamic 
terror cell in Germany. Paul provided explosives training. Upon his return to Ohio 
from Germany, Paul had a member of his group in Columbus purchase a 
printer/scanner in May 1999. Paul also bought other equipment to be use by 
extremists, including night vision equipment and a laser range finder.  In 
November 1999, bank records show that Paul wire transferred $1,760 to Mehdi, 
one of the principal members of the German cell. 
 Paul was indicted on April 11, 2007, charged with conspiracy to provide 
material support, namely sending money to a known terrorist figure in Europe. In 
2008 Paul pled guilty to conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction. As a 
result, any payments to and from Paul and others in the Ohio, the Bosnia, 
Afghanistan, or Germany, including Paul’s wire transfer, were not introduced as 
evidence and prosecutors could not disclose this information.  
 
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Cross border payments of unknown type, single small 
cross border wire transfer. 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.  
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
 
27.  The Portland 7.  Patrice Lumumba Ford, Martinique Lewis , Al Saoub, 
Maher “Mike” Hawash, Jeffrey Battle, Muhammad Bilal, and Ahmed Bilal.  
 
 Shortly after 9/11, a group of Muslim-Americans in Oregon sought to join 
Taliban forces fighting American troops in defense of al-Qaida.  They tried to 
enter Afghanistan through China, but were unsuccessful and came home.  The 
group was led by Jeffrey Battle (“Battle”) and Patrice Lumumba Ford (“Ford”) 
and included Mike Hawash. Martinique Lewis (“Lewis”), the ex-wife of co-
defendant Battle, was allegedly involved in money laundering.  She admitted that 
she transferred or transmitted money or funds from the United States to a place 
outside the country for the purpose of assisting Battle in willfully supplying 
services to the Taliban.  When told about the money in October Lewis allegedly 
wired to Battle, who federal officials said was headed to Afghanistan, the money. 
Lewis did not travel with the group; she was charged with supporting the effort by 
sending money to Battle in Hong Kong and Bangladesh. 
 All seven eventually pled guilty. In his plea agreement Ford admitted that 
he had wired $500 through Western Union to Al Saoub in Guangzhou, China, and 
$200 to Ahmed Bilal in Indonesia.83 He also admitted that he had wired an 
additional $483 through Western Union to defendant Al Saoub in Guangzhou, 
China.84 In her guilty plea Lewis also admitted that on a number of occasions she 
wired money to Battle via Western Union to various locations in Hong Kong, 
China and Bangladesh in amounts ranging from $100 to $400 dollars.85 They 
were aware that on each occasion the money wired was to be used to support 
Battle’s continuing attempts to enter Afghanistan to fight in jihad for the Taliban 
against the United States and its allies. 
 Because of the guilty pleas details of the payments were not admitted as 
evidence. 
 
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.   
 
Type of Transaction(s):  Small number of small MSB wire transfers from one 
jurisdiction to several individuals in multiple jurisdictions.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
 
28.  The LAX Millenium Plot, Mokhtar Haouari, Abdelghani Meskini and 
Ahmed Ressam.  In 1994, Haouari met Ressam.   
 
 The so-called “Millennium Plot” to bomb Los Angeles International 
Airport (“LAX”) in late December 1999 involved Mokhtar Haouari (“Haouari”), 
Abdelghani Meskini (“Meskini”) and Ahmed Ressam (“Ressam”).  In 1994, 
Haouari met Ressam, a fellow Algerian, in Montréal. Between 1996 and 1997, 
Ressam sold Haouari stolen identification documents, charge cards and a fake 
Canadian passport. In 1998, Ressam left for Afghanistan to attend terrorist 
training camps. Months before Ressam's departure, Haouari had met up with 
                                                 
83 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
84 Id. 
85 Possible smurfing, if the small amounts were used to avoid suspicion or detection. 
Meskini, another Algerian, who had arrived in Montréal in October 1997. On 
various occasions between 1997 and 1999, Haouari provided Meskini with fake 
Canadian passports and other forms of identification, some of which Meskini used 
to commit bank and credit card fraud.  
 By the summer of 1999, Ressam wanted to obtain a credit card. He 
contacted Haouari and asked if he could “pretend [to be] working” in Haouari's 
store, Artisanat Nord-Sud, in order to qualify for a credit card. Haouari agreed. He 
filled out an application for Ressam under the latter's alias, “Benni Noris.” 
Ressam received the Royal Bank Visa card.   
 Around November 17, 1999, Ressam flew from Montréal to Vancouver. 
He said that he would call Haouari and let him know when to contact his friend 
Meskini.  Ressam combined the $3,000 in cash he had received from Haouari 
with money he already had. He bought chemicals, instruments and airline tickets 
with the money. He also rented a car and paid for a hotel room. For two weeks, 
Ressam stayed in Vancouver and prepared the chemical materials for the 
explosives.  By the beginning of December 1999, Ressam had returned to 
Montréal. On his first day back, he met Haouari at the store they were opening. 
Ressam said that he wanted to meet Haouari's friend in Seattle in one week. 
Haouari asked Meskini to meet that man in Seattle and to give him $1500 to 
$2000 in cash. On December 11, Meskini, who had purchased a round trip New 
York-to-Seattle airline ticket under the alias “Eduardo Rocha,” flew to Seattle. On 
December 14, 1999, Ressam called Meskini and said, “This evening, I will be in 
Seattle. I'll call you.” Ressam then left Vancouver in a rental car with the 
explosives loaded in the trunk. He took an auto ferry to Victoria and then another 
ferry to Port Angeles. 
 Meskini pleaded guilty. Haouari and Ressam were found guilty of 
providing material support.  All transactions other than those undertaken though 
the visa card was in cash.  No bank transactions records were introduced into 
evidence.  
 
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Fraudulent credit card application, credit card payments.  
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  Yes.     
 
 
29.  Aafia Siddiqui, Mohammad Khan  
 
 Aafia Siddiqui (“Siddiqui”), a Pakistanti national, came to the U.S. in 
1990 and was later married to Mohammad Khan.  She attended college and 
graduate school and received a PhD in 2001.  In 2001, Siddiqui made regular 
debit-card payments from her account at Fleet National Bank in Boston to 
Benevolence International (“BI”), designated a SDTO in 2002.  From another 
account they repeated debit-card purchases from stores that specialize in high-tech 
military equipment and apparel, including Black Hawk Industries in Chesapeake, 
Virginia and Brigade Quartermasters in Georgia. Black Hawk's website advertises 
grips, mounts and parts for AK-47s and other military-assault rifles as well as 
highly specialized combat clothing, including vests designed for bomb disposal.  
They also made major purchases from U.S. airlines and hotels in Pittsburgh, PA 
and North Carolina as well as an $8,000 international wire transfer on December 
21, 2001 to an individual with an account in Habib Bank in Pakistan.86  Following 
BI’s designation Fleet National Bank began an investigation and filed a 
suspicious activity report. 
 
On March 1, 2003 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, in Pakistani custody, allegedly 
named Siddiqui as sympathetic.  FBI Agents allegedly found evidence that she 
had rented a post-office box to help a Baltimore, Maryland-based individual 
alleged to have been an al-Qaeda contact who had been assigned by Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed to blow up underground gasoline-storage tanks. Siddiqui was 
arrested in 2008 on charges related to attempted murder and assault of United 
States officers and employees in Afghanistan.   She was convicted in February 
2010 of attempted murder of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.  Because no other 
charges were filed no evidence was admitted concerning financial institution 
transactions.   
 
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Debit card payments to a designated terrorist organization 
and to high-tech military equipment companies; medium sized cross-border wire 
transfer to an unknown person. 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Possible. Possible terrorist financing in repeat 
purchases from military equipment store?   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
 
30.  Mohamed Adbullah Warsame.   
 
 On January 20, 2004, Mohamed Abdullah Warsame (“Warsame”), a 
naturalized Canadian citizen was charged with conspiracy to provide material 
support to a designated FTO. According to the allegations, in March 2000, 
                                                 
86 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
Warsame traveled to Afghanistan where he attended a training camp outside 
Kabul. al-Qaeda funds were used to pay for his airline ticket travel to Afghanistan 
and to provide him $1,700 traveling money, although it is not known how these 
payments were made. In the summer of 2000, Warsame attended the al-Faruq 
training. Warsame subsequently worked at an al-Qaeda guesthouse and clinic. In 
late March 2001, Warsame traveled from Pakistan, via London, to Canada. After 
leaving Pakistan, Warsame wired from his individual bank account in the U.S. 
approximately $2,000 to one of his former camp commanders.87 Warsame then 
relocated to Minneapolis, MN. Throughout 2002-2003, Warsame continued to 
exchange emails with, and provide information to, several individuals associated 
with al-Qaeda. 
 Warsame pled guilty to one count of material support. No information 
regarding financial transfers was admitted as evidence.  
    
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.   
 
Type of Transaction(s): Medium-sized cross border wire transfer. 
 
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.   
 
Proceeds of Crime?  No.     
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